Occupational Stigma, Labor Supply and Worker Migration *

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Abstract

We study how occupational stigma shapes labor supply and the spatial allocation of labor through three experiments in India. In the first experiment with 582 households, respondents evaluate the same construction job in their own village, a nearby panchayat, and the city, with wages held fixed across locations. The increase in labor supply between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers is 12.0 ppt larger among caste groups facing greater stigma from construction work, while labor supply among groups facing less stigma remains essentially unchanged. For city jobs, the corresponding difference-in-differences in labor supply is 32.5 ppt. Although the city–village contrast is not entirely attributable to stigma, the nearby-panchayat–village contrast provides a lower bound on its stigma-driven component. Respondents who report greater stigma also exhibit larger spatial differences in labor supply. A second experiment with migrant construction workers recruited at labor stands in the city reproduces this pattern and suggests that these workers face greater stigma than those in the village sample. A third, hypothetical experiment with young men in the city extends these findings to app-based delivery work, where stigma is linked to educational status. Respondents report greater willingness to accept the delivery job outside their own neighborhood than within it, and this difference is larger among men with more education. Together, these findings show how occupational stigma for a range of occupations can restrict local labor supply while creating an incentive to perform the same work elsewhere, thereby shaping the geography of labor supply within occupations.

JEL codes: C93, D91, J22, J61, O15, Z13

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1 Introduction

Social image concerns shape behavior across a wide range of domains (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). In labor markets, social norms influence whether husbands support their wives' employment outside the home (Bursztyn et al., 2020) and whether workers accept wage cuts when their decisions are observable to peers (Breza et al., 2026). Social norms may also influence which occupations workers are willing to enter by defining what work is considered appropriate for people of different social positions (Weiss and Fershtman, 1998; Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999). For example, highly educated workers may avoid doing blue-collar work if family members and peers regard these jobs as beneath someone with their education. Similarly, members of groups that rank high in the social hierarchy may avoid manual or domestic work because it conflicts with expectations associated with their group's status, even when they are economically disadvantaged. In both cases, accepting the job may expose the worker to disapproval because the occupation conflicts with the social position they are expected to maintain. This non-pecuniary cost can lead workers to reject jobs they would otherwise be willing to accept, thereby reducing labor supply (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Yet evidence on how occupational stigma affects labor supply remains limited (Breza and Kaur, 2025).

Occupational stigma may affect not only whether workers supply labor, but also where they are willing to work. When stigma arises from anticipated judgment by a reference group, its expected cost depends on the likelihood that members of that group learn about the work. A worker may be more willing to perform the same job at the same wage in a location where the work is less likely to become known to that audience. Migration can reduce this exposure by separating the workplace from the worker's home community (Fan and Stark, 2011). This creates a social-image incentive to work away from home and adds another dimension to a central question in labor and development economics: why some workers move across space while others remain in their home communities (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Stark and Bloom, 1985; Bryan et al., 2014; Morten, 2019).

In this paper, we empirically study how occupational stigma affects labor supply and migration. We first ask whether stigma reduces workers' willingness to accept jobs that are stigmatized by their reference group and visible to its members. We then ask whether occupational stigma creates an incentive to migrate by increasing workers' willingness to perform the same job away from home, where the work is less visible to the relevant reference group. We answer these questions through a field experiment on construction work in rural Bihar, a replication among workers seeking construction employment in the city, and a hypothetical survey experiment involving delivery-job offers to urban youth.

India provides a useful setting for studying this question because social status has long been structured by caste, a hereditary system of social stratification in which caste groups occupy different positions in the social hierarchy. As a result, the same type of work can carry different

status implications across caste groups.[1] Caste is also fixed prior to labor-market choices, providing a predetermined source of variation in the expected social cost of a particular occupation. In our pre-experiment surveys, manual labor work attracts substantially greater social disapproval among *Upper(ed)* and *Backward caste* respondents than among *Scheduled* and *Extremely Backward* caste respondents.[2] We use this variation to distinguish workers for whom manual labor is more socially stigmatized from those for whom it is less so. We conduct the experiment in rural subdistricts of Patna district in the state of Bihar and throughout the paper, "the city" therefore refers to Patna.

We first develop a framework for workers' decisions to accept the same job at different locations. The job's non-wage value can vary because of occupational stigma and other location-specific amenities and disamenities. Guided by this framework, we conduct a field experiment with 582 eligible households in rural Bihar, each containing a male worker who had engaged in manual wage labor during the previous year. Respondents evaluate the same construction job in their own village, a village in a nearby panchayat, and Patna, roughly 25 to 50 kilometers away. The task, hours, duration, and wage schedule in the offer are held fixed across locations. At each location, respondents first receive an INR 550 offer; those who decline receive an INR 600 offer. Moving the worksite changes the likelihood that the worker's reference group learns about the work. After the offer block, one of the six location–wage combinations is selected at random. With a one-in-ten probability, the recorded decision determines whether the worker receives a contractor referral at the stated wage, giving respondents an incentive to answer each offer truthfully.

To relate workers' location choices directly to occupational stigma, we collect two measures before presenting the job offers. Each respondent reports whether they would feel shame doing construction work in their own village and how many out of ten workers from their caste would choose the village job over the city job at the same wage. The first measures individual stigma; the second is a second-order measure of stigma within the worker's caste, with lower expected village take-up indicating greater stigma. On both measures, Upper/OBC respondents exhibit greater stigma than EBC/SC respondents.

One concern is that location can affect the value of the job and thereby labor supply through channels other than stigma. A change in location of the worksite can change commuting costs, workers' exposure to socioeconomic vulnerability (Kapoor and Kumar, 2026), or the value of social networks formed at the destination. Our primary empirical object is therefore the change in labor supply between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers, compared across the higher (Upper/OBC)- and lower (EBC/SC)-stigma groups. This difference-in-differences isolates the ef-

[1] Srinivas's account of Sanskritization emphasizes the collective adoption of practices associated with higher status to secure recognition of claims to higher caste rank (Srinivas, 1956). This connection between collective practices and social standing suggests that publicly visible departures from group norms may invite disapproval from within the group.

[2] We use "Upper(ed)" here to emphasize that groups are made "upper" through a socially imposed and enforced caste hierarchy, without implying any inherent superiority. In the remainder of the paper, we use "Upper" to align with established usage, while retaining this understanding of caste rank as an imposed social position.

fect of occupational stigma under the assumption that other amenities and disamenities associated with moving from the own village to the nearby panchayat do not differentially affect the two groups. We argue that this assumption is plausible because the two locations are geographically close and expose workers to similar economic environments, while differing meaningfully in social observability: work in the nearby panchayat is less likely to be observed by members of the worker's reference group. Under this assumption, a larger increase in labor supply for the higher-stigma group identifies the extent to which reduced social observability attenuates the cost of occupational stigma.

The increase in take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers is 12.0 percentage points (ppt) larger among Upper/OBC respondents than among EBC/SC respondents ($p < 0.001$). This difference-in-differences is driven by the higher-stigma group, as take-up among EBC/SC respondents remains essentially unchanged across the two offers. For the own-village offer, take-up is 25.1 ppt lower among Upper/OBC respondents than among EBC/SC respondents. The nearby-panchayat offer closes roughly half of this gap while holding the job and wage fixed. Under our identifying assumptions, this result shows that reducing exposure to occupational stigma increases labor supply. Scaling this estimate by the observed response to the INR 50 wage increment yields an approximate linear wage equivalent of INR 126 per day, roughly one-fifth of the offered daily wage.

The city offer connects occupational stigma to the incentive to migrate. A job in the city creates substantially greater separation from the worker's reference group and may therefore further reduce social observability. The city–own-village difference-in-differences in take-up is 32.5 ppt ($p < 0.001$). Take-up among EBC/SC respondents falls by 19.4 ppt between the own-village and city offers, accounting for part of this larger contrast. Because city work changes other amenities and disamenities as well as exposure to the worker's reference group, the full city contrast combines stigma-related and other location effects.

Under the nearby comparison's identifying restriction and an additional testable assumption, our framework establishes that the nearby-panchayat–village difference-in-differences provides a lower bound on the stigma component of the city response. The additional assumption requires the further reduction in expected social costs between the nearby panchayat and the city to be at least as large, on average, for Upper/OBC respondents as for EBC/SC respondents. For example, if every worker perceives the same further reduction in observability, the group facing greater average stigma gains more on average.

We assess the observable implications using reported observability and the pre-offer stigma measures. On a 0–10 scale, observability falls from 6.31 in the nearby panchayat to 2.56 in the city among Upper/OBC respondents, and from 6.56 to 2.58 among EBC/SC respondents. Similar reductions, together with greater reported stigma among Upper/OBC respondents, are consistent with the assumption. The estimates are robust to own-village fixed effects, respondent fixed effects, respondent characteristics interacted with location, and controls for location-specific ratings of payment reliability, work difficulty, and non-wage benefits.

Next, we use direct measures of occupational stigma to examine whether stigma predicts the change in take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers. Respondents who report shame about performing construction in their own village exhibit a 24.8-ppt larger increase in take-up between these two offers than respondents who do not ($p < 0.001$). A one-standard-deviation increase in second order beliefs about stigma is associated with a 7.7-ppt larger increase in take-up for the nearby-panchayat offer relative to the own-village offer ($p < 0.001$). We then re-estimate the main specification, allowing the change in take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers to vary with either self-reported shame or second order beliefs. In each case, the estimated Upper/OBC–EBC/SC difference in this change falls by roughly half. Thus, the direct measures of occupational stigma account for a substantial share of the caste-based difference in labor supply across the two locations. Even within the EBC/SC group, respondents who report shame about performing construction in their own village increase their take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers by 19.2 ppt more than respondents who report no shame ($p < 0.001$). Among respondents who decline the own-village or nearby-panchayat offer, Upper/OBC respondents are 35.5 ppt more likely than EBC/SC respondents to cite being seen doing construction work as a reason for declining.

To examine whether the same pattern of labor supply appears among workers who are demonstrably willing to do construction work away from their own village, we repeat the experiment with 236 migrant construction workers recruited at labor stands in the city. These workers had migrated from rural areas and were searching for construction work in the city. The nearby-panchayat–own-village difference-in-differences is 8.3 ppt ($p = 0.042$). The city–own-village difference-in-differences in labor supply is larger, 40.8 ppt ($p < 0.001$), and exceeds the corresponding estimate in the village sample. Together, these findings are consistent with migrant construction workers being more willing to do the same work outside their own village, where members of their community are less likely to see them.

To assess whether the effects of occupational stigma on labor supply generalize beyond rural construction work and caste-based status, we conduct a hypothetical survey experiment with 289 young men in the city of Patna. We study app-based delivery work and use education as the relevant dimension of status: educated men may regard delivery work as beneath the standing they expect their qualifications to confer. Each respondent evaluates the same delivery job in their own neighbourhood and in the adjacent neighbourhood, at the same monthly earnings. Moving the job one neighbourhood away increases stated acceptance by 14.7 ppt ($p < 0.001$). This increase is 9.6 ppt larger among men who studied beyond class 12 than among those with class 12 or less ($p = 0.034$). Respondents who report greater shame about delivery work also respond more strongly to the change in location. Although the offers measure stated rather than incentivized willingness to work, they reproduce the central pattern of the village experiment in a different population, occupation, and status hierarchy. These findings suggest that occupational stigma shapes where workers are willing to accept jobs across settings, including urban service work where education is a source of social status.

Together, these findings identify a spatial dimension of occupational stigma. Workers can respond to the social cost of an occupation by changing where they perform it, even while remaining willing to do the same work at the same offered wage. Occupational stigma can therefore shape the geography of labor supply, and local job refusals can provide an incomplete picture of willingness to work in that occupation (Breza and Kaur, 2025) . The evidence also shows why participation in stigmatized work away from home can coexist with continued social disapproval within the home community.

Literature and Contributions This paper contributes to the literature on how social identity, status, and social-image concerns shape labor supply. Economic models show how identity and social status can influence occupational choice (Weiss and Fershtman, 1998; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Gola, 2024). Empirical research links caste-based status concerns to participation in market work (Eswaran et al., 2013) and shows that the social observability of economic decisions can affect labor-market behavior (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Breza et al., 2026). As Breza and Kaur (2025) emphasize, workers' preferences for employment outside of wages are important for understanding why available jobs may go unfilled in developing economies. We contribute to this literature by showing that the social cost of employment depends on the interaction between occupation, work location, and the worker's reference group. The same occupation can carry different social costs depending on whether performing it becomes known within the home community. Occupational stigma can therefore discourage workers from accepting local employment even when they are willing to perform the same work elsewhere.

Our findings also contribute to research on workers' valuations of non-wage job attributes. Mas and Pallais (2017) use a choice experiment embedded in recruitment to estimate workers' willingness to pay for alternative work arrangements, including scheduling arrangements and the option to work from home. We examine a different dimension of job valuation: whether the worker's reference group becomes aware of the occupation they perform. This distinction also helps separate our findings from those of Oh (2023), who shows that caste identity can discourage workers from accepting jobs associated with other castes even when their choices are private. Such identity costs can persist regardless of whether others observe the work. Our experiment examines an additional cost that depends on social observability. By holding the construction task and wage fixed across locations, we hold constant any intrinsic cost of performing the occupation that does not vary with location.

The paper also contributes to the literature on migration and the spatial allocation of labor. Research in this area emphasizes expected earnings (Harris and Todaro, 1970), risk and household insurance (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Bryan et al., 2014; Morten, 2019), and the role of social networks in facilitating or constraining migration (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). Fan and Stark (2011) develop a theory in which migration allows workers to escape the humiliation associated with low-status occupations, even in the absence of economic differences between locations. We provide real world evidence for the labor-supply mechanism underlying this argument. Workers

facing greater occupational stigma are more willing to accept the same construction job outside their own village, even when the wage and tasks remain unchanged. Importantly, this response also occurs when work is offered in a nearby panchayat, where accepting the job does not require a change of residence. Evidence from migrant construction workers and a hypothetical experiment involving urban delivery work suggests that this pattern extends beyond the original village sample. Our findings thus identify a margin of adjustment within an occupation: workers may accept work away from home that they reject locally because it is less visible to their reference group. Occupational norms can therefore segment labor supply across locations, rather than only across occupations. Working away from home can accommodate these norms without requiring an occupational change or a destination wage premium.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the setting and occupational stigma associated with construction work. Section 4 presents the experimental design and identification strategy. Section 5 reports the main results and evidence from migrant construction workers. Section 6 presents the experiment with urban youth, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Conceptual Framework

This section describes a conceptual framework that helps disentangle the different forces which may affect the labor supply of workers across locations.

We first describe the choice of a general job across locations and then specialize the framework to the experiment. Throughout, i indexes workers, j indexes jobs, and ℓ indexes locations. In the experiment there is only one job—construction—and three locations: V is the worker's own *village*, N is a village in a *nearby panchayat*, and P is the city. Each location comparison holds the occupation fixed, so we suppress its index on location-specific attributes. All costs and benefits are measured in units of the offered wage.

2.1 The social cost of observed work

Worker i cares about the judgments of a reference group $\mathcal{R}_i$, which may include relatives, neighbours, caste peers, or other socially important contacts. Let $B_{ij} \geq 0$ be the wage-equivalent penalty the worker would bear if the relevant audience learned that they performed occupation j. We call this the worker's *stigma burden*. It combines disapproval of the occupation with the importance of that disapproval to the worker. Two workers doing the same job can therefore face different burdens because their audiences, the norms those audiences enforce, or the value they place on those relationships differ.[3]

[3] An additive representation is $B_{ij} = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{R}_i} a_{ip} d_{ipj}$, where $d_{ipj} \geq 0$ is person p's disapproval of worker i doing job j, conditional on learning about it, and $a_{ip} \geq 0$ is the worker's valuation of that person's opinion or sanctioning capacity. Appendix E.1 shows how individual discovery probabilities aggregate into the exposure measure used here.

Let $\rho_{i\ell} \in [0,1]$ measure exposure to this audience when the job is performed at location ℓ. Expected social cost is

$$\rho_{i\ell} B_{ij}. \tag{2.1}$$

$\rho_{i\ell}$ captures an average of the discovery probabilities weighted by audience members' contributions to the stigma burden. The survey's observability reports provide a proxy for this exposure.

For a fixed occupation, we hold the reference group and the penalty conditional on discovery constant across locations. Location changes the chance that socially consequential observers learn about the work. This separates the stigma attached to an occupation, B_{ij}, from its exposure at a particular worksite, $\rho_{i\ell}$. A job can be visible to strangers in the city yet comparatively concealed from the worker's home reference group. The model allows occupational stigma to persist when work moves, while its expected social cost falls.

2.2 Accepting a job at a location

Let r_i be the value of rejecting the offer and κ_{ij} the location-invariant cost of doing job j, including effort, risk, and any intrinsic discomfort with the occupation. Let $q_{i\ell}$ be the value of the location's other attributes relative to the home location, with $q_{iV} = 0$. These attributes include commuting costs, access to employers and networks, and separation from home. We refer to $q_{i\ell}$ as the *non-stigma value of location*: it excludes the exposure-dependent social penalty. A positive value makes the location more attractive, holding that penalty fixed. Both $q_{i\ell}$ and $\rho_{i\ell}$ may differ across occupations, although their job index is suppressed within each fixed-job comparison.

The worker's reservation wage is

$$\omega_{ij\ell} = r_i + \kappa_{ij} - q_{i\ell} + \rho_{i\ell} B_{ij}. \tag{2.2}$$

At an offered wage w, accepting yields surplus $w - \omega_{ij\ell}$ relative to rejection. We adopt acceptance at indifference, so take-up is

$$T_{ij\ell}(w) = \mathbb{1}\{w \geq \omega_{ij\ell}\}. \tag{2.3}$$

Higher wages and more attractive location attributes increase willingness to work. A larger stigma burden or greater exposure weakly raises the reservation wage and can induce rejection. These effects are weak for binary take-up: a change affects the decision only if it crosses the worker's acceptance threshold. Location-invariant identity costs can remain in κ_{ij} even when the exposure-dependent penalty is absent.

Comparing the same job across locations. Define the net value of working at location ℓ rather than at home as

$$C_{ij\ell} \equiv \omega_{ijV} - \omega_{ij\ell} = q_{i\ell} + G_{ij\ell}, \qquad G_{ij\ell} \equiv (\rho_{iV} - \rho_{i\ell}) B_{ij}. \tag{2.4}$$

Here $G_{ij\ell}$ is the *stigma-avoidance benefit*; $C_{ij\ell}$ also includes the other costs and benefits of the location. The outside option and the cost of the task cancel because the worker and occupation are held fixed. A positive $C_{ij\ell}$ means the worker requires a lower wage to perform the job elsewhere. It does not, by itself, establish a role for stigma, since the location may also have a positive non-stigma value.

Lower exposure makes a stigmatized job more attractive, holding its other attributes fixed. It also increases the relative attraction of working away from home: for a given reduction in exposure, the gain is larger when B_{ij} is larger. This can offset commuting or migration costs. If a destination M requires migration, its job is strictly preferred to the same job at home at an equal wage when

$$q_{iM} + (\rho_{iV} - \rho_{iM})B_{ij} > 0. \tag{2.5}$$

Accepting that destination job additionally requires $w \geq \omega_{ijM}$. Thus, stigma can strengthen the incentive to work away while reducing willingness to accept either job. Whether the adjustment takes the form of commuting or migration depends on the available locations and their costs. Appendix Proposition 1 proves these claims.

2.3 Comparing groups with different expected stigma

The empirical comparisons distinguish a group expected to face higher occupational stigma, H, from a comparison group, L. These are classifications based on predetermined characteristics, such as caste for construction work or education for delivery work. They do not require all members of H to face greater stigma than all members of L, and the comparison group may also face stigma.

For any worker-level variable X_i, write $\Delta_g \mathrm{E}[X_i] \equiv \mathrm{E}[X_i \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[X_i \mid L]$. Define $\Delta B_j = \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[B_{ij}]$, $\Delta q_\ell = \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[q_{i\ell}]$, and the between-group difference in the value of working elsewhere as

$$D_{j\ell} \equiv \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[C_{ij\ell}] = \Delta q_\ell + \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[G_{ij\ell}]. \tag{2.6}$$

This decomposition separates differences in the non-stigma value of location from differences in the stigma-avoidance benefit. It permits stigma burdens, exposure changes, and location preferences to vary across workers and to be correlated.[4]

Two distinctions matter for interpreting the experiment. First, the expected stigma-avoidance benefit depends on the joint distribution of stigma and exposure changes, not just their separate means. Second, $D_{j\ell}$ is measured in wage units, whereas observed acceptance is binary. In general, workers with the same valuation change can respond differently because they start at different acceptance thresholds. To connect these two outcomes, we impose a common affine response over the range of offer values used in the comparison. This restriction makes the nearby identification result and the city take-up bound follow from the underlying cost comparisons.

[4]If the exposure change is common to all workers, the expression simplifies to $D_{j\ell} = \Delta q_\ell + (\rho_V - \rho_\ell)\Delta B_j$. The general formulation does not impose this restriction. Appendix Proposition 2 establishes both expressions.

2.4 Mapping the framework to the experiment

We now suppress the job index. The home location V supplies the benchmark, the nearby location N changes exposure while keeping central offer attributes similar, and the city P introduces an urban destination. In the construction offers, the job, wage schedule, hours, and duration are held fixed, while the nearby comparison also matches approximate commuting time and permits daily return home. The own-versus-next-neighbourhood delivery comparison uses the same fixed-occupation logic and the corresponding nearby identifying restrictions; the separate city arm and its lower bound concern construction. Comparing delivery with a call-centre job instead changes the occupation and is not a pure location comparison.

Identification assumptions. The first two assumptions describe the expected ordering of exposure and stigma. The third excludes a differential non-stigma value of nearby work. The fourth maps changes in offer value into acceptance probabilities, and the fifth orders the additional stigma-avoidance gain from city work.

Assumption 1 (Observability ordering)**.** *Within each group $g \in \{H, L\}$, average perceived exposure satisfies*

$$\mathrm{E}[\rho_{iV} \mid g] > \mathrm{E}[\rho_{iN} \mid g] \geq \mathrm{E}[\rho_{iP} \mid g].$$

Assumption 2 (Stigma ordering)**.** *The high-stigma group faces a weakly larger average stigma burden for the occupation:*

$$\Delta B = \mathrm{E}[B_i \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[B_i \mid L] \geq 0.$$

Assumption 3 (No differential non-social valuation of the nearby location)**.** *The groups assign the same average non-stigma value to performing the job nearby rather than at home:*

$$\Delta q_N = \mathrm{E}[q_{iN} \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[q_{iN} \mid L] = 0.$$

To connect valuations to acceptance, write $a_i = r_i + \kappa_i$ for the worker's outside option plus the location-invariant cost of the job. Let $Z_i = (q_{iN}, q_{iP}, B_i, \rho_{iV}, \rho_{iN}, \rho_{iP})$ collect the location values, stigma burden, and exposure at each location. Define

$$F_g(t \mid z) = \mathrm{P}(a_i \leq t \mid Z_i = z, g).$$

This distribution describes heterogeneity in reservation costs among workers with the same stigma and location attributes. The threshold rule implies that conditional acceptance at location ℓ is $F_g(w + q_\ell - \rho_\ell B \mid z)$. We restrict its slope over the relevant thresholds, while allowing baseline acceptance probabilities to differ across groups and worker types.

Assumption 4 (Common affine response to offer value)**.** *For each offered wage w, there is a common slope $b(w) > 0$ such that, for each group g and almost every z in its support,*

$$F_g(w + x \mid z) = F_g(w \mid z) + b(w)x \qquad \text{for all } x \in I(z), \tag{2.7}$$

where $I(z)$ is the smallest closed interval containing

$$\{q_\ell,\ q_\ell - \rho_\ell B : \ell \in \{V, N, P\}\}, \qquad q_V = 0.$$

The right-hand side lies in $[0, 1]$ on this interval, and the restrictions at all offered wages hold for the same conditional distribution F_g.

Assumption 4 gives the conditional distribution of reservation costs a common constant density over the relevant threshold range. Its level can differ across groups and worker types; its slope cannot. The restriction covers all three locations, including the city, and both actual offers and their counterparts without the expected social penalty. It is exact over that range, rather than a global linear probability specification or a first-order approximation. For construction it applies at INR 550 and INR 600. For the delivery comparison, the analogous restriction uses its two locations and offered wages.

Let $T^0_{i\ell}(w)$ denote potential acceptance with $\rho_{i\ell}B_i$ removed, holding the wage, outside option, task cost, and other location attributes fixed. Any intrinsic identity cost in κ_i remains. Under Assumption 4, removing the social penalty and changing the non-stigma value of location translate into probability changes at the same slope $b(w)$. Assumption 3 then implies parallel nearby take-up in this counterfactual; it need not be imposed as a separate restriction.

The observed difference-in-differences in take-up at wage w is

$$\delta_\ell(w) \equiv \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[T_{i\ell}(w) - T_{iV}(w)]. \tag{2.8}$$

To describe its stigma component, define the acceptance loss caused by the expected social penalty at each location,

$$R_{g\ell}(w) \equiv \mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) - T_{i\ell}(w) \mid g], \tag{2.9}$$

This is the share of workers who would accept the offer without the social penalty but reject it when the penalty is present. Define the between-group difference in the change in that loss relative to home as

$$S^T_\ell(w) \equiv [R_{HV}(w) - R_{H\ell}(w)] - [R_{LV}(w) - R_{L\ell}(w)]. \tag{2.10}$$

The superscript T distinguishes this probability-unit component from wage-equivalent social gains. Define the location interaction without the social penalty as

$$\delta^0_\ell(w) \equiv \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) - T^0_{iV}(w)].$$

The observed interaction decomposes as

$$\delta_\ell(w) = \delta_\ell^0(w) + S_\ell^T(w). \tag{2.11}$$

Under Assumption 4, these components satisfy $\delta_\ell^0(w) = b(w)\Delta q_\ell$ and $S_\ell^T(w) = b(w)\Delta_g \mathrm{E}[G_{i\ell}]$. Assumption 3 therefore gives $\delta_N^0(w) = 0$ and identifies the nearby stigma component:

$$\delta_N(w) = S_N^T(w) = b(w)D_N, \qquad D_N = \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[G_{iN}]. \tag{2.12}$$

Thus the nearby acceptance interaction measures the between-group difference in stigma-avoidance gains, scaled by the common response slope. This derivation allows different baseline acceptance rates and correlated stigma and location attributes, while restricting their marginal effect on acceptance over the stated range. Appendix Propositions 2 and 3 prove the decompositions and the implication for parallel counterfactual take-up.

The city comparison may also reflect differences in networks, future opportunities, or travel costs. Its stigma component in wage units is $S_P \equiv \Delta_g \mathrm{E}[G_{iP}]$, giving

$$D_P = S_P + \Delta q_P. \tag{2.13}$$

We impose no equality or sign restriction on Δq_P; under Assumption 4, its take-up counterpart is $\delta_P^0(w) = b(w)\Delta q_P$. Instead of attributing the entire city response to stigma, we use the nearby response to bound its stigma component. The additional city restriction concerns the underlying stigma costs.

Assumption 5 (Monotone differential exposure gain in city)**.** *The additional stigma-avoidance benefit of city rather than nearby work is weakly larger for the high-stigma group:*

$$\mathrm{E}[(\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i \mid H] \geq \mathrm{E}[(\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i \mid L]. \tag{2.14}$$

This assumption orders the additional social gain from moving beyond the nearby location. The exposure and stigma orderings motivate it but do not imply it, because individual exposure changes can covary with stigma burdens. The common affine response in Assumption 4 transfers this cost ordering into take-up units.

Under Assumptions 3 and 5, the nearby valuation contrast bounds the wage-equivalent stigma component of city work:

$$S_P \geq D_N. \tag{2.15}$$

Adding Assumption 4 gives $S_P^T(w) = b(w)S_P$ and $\delta_N(w) = b(w)D_N$. Since $b(w) > 0$, the bound holds directly in take-up units:

$$\boxed{S_P^T(w) \geq \delta_N(w).} \tag{2.16}$$

Appendix Proposition 4 proves both inequalities. Thus, a positive nearby interaction establishes a positive lower bound on stigma's contribution to the between-group city response, without re-

quiring equal non-stigma valuations of the city. The estimated nearby interaction provides an estimate of this population lower bound, with the sampling uncertainty reported in the results. The bound also holds for a common nonnegative weighted average across offered wages (Appendix Corollary 1).

The bounded object is the stigma component of the city contrast. Since the total response also contains $\delta_P^0(w)$, the argument does not require that total city take-up rise in either group or that $\delta_P(w) \geq \delta_N(w)$. This distinction permits the city to have different economic attractions across groups while preserving the central inference about occupational stigma. Observability and stigma reports provide evidence about the proposed mechanism, and the matched nearby offers and amenity measures support the exclusion restriction. The common affine response is a maintained functional-form restriction: similar observed wage responses can inform its plausibility, but do not establish it over every actual and counterfactual threshold used in the argument.

3 Setting and Occupational Stigma

We conduct the main experiment of our study in 28 villages located roughly 25 to 50 kilometers from Patna, the capital of the Indian state of Bihar. The villages are close enough to Patna that workers can commute to the city for work. Construction is the largest source of non-farm employment for manual workers in these villages. It is also common within villages, reflecting both rapid local growth and government housing programs that subsidize residential construction.

This section first describes the characteristics of the workers recruited for the experiment. We then document the central fact underlying the paper's empirical design: construction work carries a social penalty for some caste groups but not for others. We establish this using survey measures of stigma associated with construction work.

3.1 Setting and Sample

Surveyors visited 866 households across the 28 study villages. The villages were chosen from a sample of villages in 4 sub-districts of Patna. Our sampling strategy involved conducting the experiment with 10-20% of the households in the village stratified by caste (Upper/OBC or EBC/SC). Prior to visiting the village, we collected information about the caste break-up of the village from the elected representatives. With this information we calculated the number of households of each village with whom we had to conduct the experiment. Surveyors then randomly sampled households within the village for the survey.

Each household first completed a brief screening module. Households with at least one male worker engaged in manual wage labor within one year of the survey were eligible to participate in the experiment, yielding an experimental sample of 582 households.[5] The remaining 284 households with no worker engaged in manual wage laborer completed the stigma module described

[5]Manual wage labor includes both agricultural and construction labor.

below but did not receive job offers. We retain these screened-out households as a separate sample. Because respondents in these households do not themselves supply construction labor, their responses provide a measure of village-level norms that is less directly tied to their own labor-market choices. If the member engaged in manual labor was not present in the house at the time of the survey, the experiment was conducted with a proxy member on their behalf. We later show that all our estimates are robust to excluding these households.

For the main analysis, we group caste categories according to the observed pattern of occupational stigma. Upper castes and OBCs (Upper/OBC hereafter) occupy a higher position in the traditional caste hierarchy. Due to higher social status, visible participation in such work is likely to carry a social penalty imposed by their reference groups. Extremely Backward and Scheduled caste (EBC/SC) respondents, by contrast, are lower in the caste hierarchy and manual labor is more socially customary and therefore may carry substantially less of this penalty.[6] Importantly, construction work is not a traditional caste based occupation of any caste group in our sample allaying concerns that identity effects on labor supply might be at play (Oh, 2023). Even then, the traditional occupation of certain castes may have involved manual labor work. Our design overcomes these issues by utilizing comparison in labor supply across locations.

Table 1 reports the characteristics of the experimental respondents by caste group. The two groups are similar to each other on most margins, with Upper/OBC workers being slightly more educated and economically well off. Upper/OBC workers average 37.4 years of age against 36.3, schooling averages 5.6 years against 5.1, household size is 6.3 against 6.2, and monthly household income is INR 16,254 against INR 15,621. Wealth differences are modest but run in the expected direction. Part of the similarity in these characteristics is mechanical as the sample is selected on individuals engaged in manual labor work. Both groups have spent well over a decade as daily wagers, and roughly three-quarters of each group (72 and 72 percent) has worked in Patna at some point, so a caste gap in taking the Patna job offer cannot be read as a gap in knowing what working in the city looks like. The main margin on which the two groups differ is interview mode: 30 percent of Upper/OBC respondents were interviewed through a proxy, typically the wife of the manual worker, compared with 16 percent of EBC/SC respondents. This imbalance may itself be related to the mechanism studied in the paper. If occupational stigma increases the incentive for Upper/OBC workers to seek work away from the village, they may be more likely to be absent when surveyors visit and hence more likely to be represented by a proxy respondent. Appendix Table A-1 reports the characteristics of screened-out households. As expected these households are wealthier and more educated than experiment households.

3.2 Occupational Stigma in Construction Work

We next establish that occupational stigma is present, varies systematically across caste groups, and is associated with social sanctions. This evidence is important for showing that the high-stigma indicator, associated with UOBC castes, used in the experiment captures a social penalty

[6]The categorization of sample into Upper/OBC and EBC/SC was pre-registered.

Table 1: Characteristics of experimental respondents, by caste group

	Upper/OBC			EBC/SC		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Age (years)	37.43	11.15	198	36.31	11.24	383
Household size (members)	6.33	2.57	198	6.20	2.62	383
Muslim	0.01	0.07	198	0.01	0.09	383
Education (years)	5.60	4.54	198	5.11	4.83	383
Household monthly income (INR)	16254.32	10596.51	162	15620.90	10281.51	312
Concrete (pucca) roof	0.79	0.41	198	0.69	0.46	383
Rooms in the house	3.18	1.78	184	2.69	1.41	370
Owns a bike	0.23	0.42	184	0.20	0.40	369
Smartphone in the household	0.73	0.44	184	0.73	0.45	368
Asset index	-0.08	0.66	198	-0.18	0.60	383
Years as a daily wager	13.42	12.48	198	14.93	11.95	383
Ever migrated for work (another district or state)	0.41	0.49	196	0.47	0.50	381
Proxy respondent	0.30	0.46	198	0.16	0.37	383
Ever worked in Patna	0.72	0.45	194	0.72	0.45	382

Notes: Experimental sample (households passing the manual-labor screen). Household income is top-coded at the 99th percentile. The asset index is the standardized mean of the roof, rooms, bike, and smartphone indicators and household income. A proxy respondent is a household member, typically the wife, answering for a migrant who is away.

that workers face rather than a classification imposed by the researchers. We draw on three sets of survey measures, ordered by their proximity to the respondent: how respondents report that their community views construction work; how many members of their own caste they believe would be willing to do construction work when visible to others in the village; and respondents' own attitudes and behavior. These measures were collected from every consenting household, including the 284 households excluded by the eligibility criteria for the experiment, and were elicited before any job offers were made.

Table 2 reports respondents' perceptions of how their own caste community views construction workers. Among Upper/OBC respondents, 46 percent report that their community views construction work negatively—by looking down on the work, mocking those who do it, or regarding it as low-status work for members of their caste—compared with 15 percent of EBC/SC respondents. The largest component of this difference is the perception that the community "looks down on" construction work, reported by 42 percent of Upper/OBC respondents compared with 14 percent of EBC/SC respondents. This caste gradient provides the attitudinal first stage for the paper: respondents in the groups classified as high-stigma report community disapproval of the same occupation roughly three times as often as respondents in the lower-stigma groups.

Because stated views of community attitudes may not translate into expected behavior, we next elicit a quantitative measure of perceived labor supply. Each respondent is asked how many out of ten workers from their own caste would take a construction job in the village when it pays the same wage as an otherwise identical job in the city. By holding wages fixed, the question removes wage differences as an explanation for choosing between the two locations. Figure 1 plots responses by caste group. Upper/OBC respondents report that on average 5.2 out of ten workers

Table 2: Community views of Construction work, by caste group

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Good, honest-labour work	0.70	839	0.55	407	0.84	431
Look down on it	0.28	839	0.42	407	0.14	431
Mock behind one's back	0.01	839	0.02	407	0.00	431
Low work for one's caste	0.03	839	0.05	407	0.00	431
Respectable work	0.01	839	0.00	407	0.01	431
Poor people's work, done from compulsion	0.04	839	0.04	407	0.04	431
Negative view (looks down, mocks, or low for caste)	0.30	839	0.46	407	0.15	431

Notes: The table reports the share of respondents naming each view when asked "How do people of your caste view those who do construction labor?". Respondents may name more than one view, so shares need not sum to one. The sample is all consenting households, asked before any job offer.


would take the village job, compared with 8.1 among EBC/SC respondents. Thus, EBC/SC respondents expect local construction work to be the default at equal wages, whereas Upper/OBC respondents expect a substantially larger share of their caste peers to choose work in the city instead. The explanations respondents give for these expectations are also informative: among those reporting low local take-up, respondents cite being seen and the prospect of taunts as reasons for choosing the city rather than the village (Appendix Table A-4).

Finally, we turn from perceived community behavior to respondents' own attitudes. A majority of Upper/OBC respondents—55 percent—report that they would feel shame doing construction labor in their own village, compared with 17 percent of EBC/SC respondents (Table 3 Panel A). An open-ended follow-up asks respondents to explain this response, which we code into categories reported in Table 4. Among the 295 respondents who provide a reason, 29 percent mention that others would taunt, laugh at, or gossip about them; 20 percent specifically identify being seen by people who know them; and 32 percent explain that their family has not traditionally done such work and that taking it up would violate an established social standing. Appendix Tables B-1 examine whether the labor screen selects households on these stigma attitudes. The results indicate that the screened out households are somewhat more stigmatized than the experimental sample.

We next examine the reference group from which respondents expect this social disapproval to come. Figure 2 reports the source that each respondent ranks as most important, separately by caste group. Among Upper/OBC respondents, disapproval comes primarily from within the worker's own social network. 36 percent identify their *gotiya* (lineage kin) as the main source of criticism. When same-caste neighbors, family members, in-laws, and friends are included, the share identifying someone within this social circle rises to 74 percent. In contrast, only 6 percent identify members of higher castes as the primary source of criticism. The pattern differs among EBC/SC respondents, of whom 21 percent identify higher castes as the main source.

An important question is how workers who migrate for stigmatized work prevent information about that work from reaching their village. The survey evidence suggests that concealment is feasible and already occurs in this setting. 77 percent report that migrants engaged in construction

Figure 1: Expected take-up of the local job at equal pay, by caste group



Notes: Each respondent is asked, of ten workers from their caste, how many would take a construction job in their own village when it pays the same as the identical job in Patna. Bars are shares of each caste group at each answer. Upper/OBC mean 5.2; EBC/SC mean 8.1. Sample: 834 consenting respondents, asked before any job offer.

commonly tell people in their village that they work in office or factory jobs. Such concealment is reported more frequently among Upper/OBC respondents, at 84 percent, than among EBC/SC respondents, at 70 percent. These patterns indicate that working away from the village can reduce the social observability of stigmatized work even when the worker's migration itself is known.

Table 3: Self-reported shame and concealment practices, by caste group


	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Panel A: Own shame and observed avoidance						
Would feel shame doing it in their own village	0.35	845	0.55	406	0.17	438
Has seen others refuse local work but do it outside	0.90	817	0.92	396	0.88	420
Panel B: Concealment methods seen used (any mention)						
Tells the village it is office or factory work	0.77	803	0.84	388	0.70	414
Good clothes and shoes on return	0.07	803	0.07	388	0.06	414
Visible spending in the village	0.02	803	0.02	388	0.02	414
Travels out and back at night	0.00	803	0.00	388	0.00	414
Group keeps a common story	0.00	803	0.00	388	0.00	414
Changes dialect or manner	0.00	803	0.00	388	0.00	414

Notes: Panel A reports two yes/no questions: whether respondents would themselves feel shame doing construction labor in their own village, and whether they have seen others refuse work in the village and then do the same work outside it. Panel B reports the share who have seen each concealment method used by migrant construction workers; a respondent may name several methods, so shares need not sum to one. The sample is all consenting households, asked before any job offer.

This distinction matters for interpreting the experiment. Among the group facing greater occupational stigma, the relevant reference group consists largely of the worker's own kin and caste peers rather than members of a socially dominant out-group. These are also the relationships through which concerns about household reputation, marriage prospects, and social standing within the village are likely to operate. Reducing the observability of construction work to this audience can therefore reduce the social cost of taking the job.[7]

Taken together, these patterns support the premise of the experimental design. For workers facing greater occupational stigma, the relevant cost appears to arise not simply from construction work itself, but from doing it under the observation of people in their own village. Workers already appear to bear costs to reduce this exposure, including working away from the village and concealing the nature of their employment.

Figure 2: Source of Stigma



Notes: Bars are the share of each caste group ranking the source first among the sources of criticism they name, sorted by the pooled share. Asked only of respondents who named at least one source ($N = 458$: 273 Upper/OBC, 185 EBC/SC). The remaining 406 of the 866 households answered that people of their caste face no such criticism — 58 percent of EBC/SC households against 35 percent of Upper/OBC.

[7] Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3 report the underlying shares and the corresponding results.

Table 4: Reasons for shame from doing construction labor in the own village

	All	Upper/OBC	EBC/SC
Social sanction			
Labour is low work, not our caste's work	0.10	0.12	0.05
People will taunt, laugh or gossip	0.29	0.31	0.25
Lowers family standing, incl. marriage prospects	0.04	0.05	0.01
Being seen by people who know them	0.20	0.21	0.15
Status			
We have never done it: no family precedent	0.32	0.29	0.40
Educated or well-off, so it is beneath them	0.14	0.11	0.22
Other			
Personal circumstance: woman, age, other work	0.06	0.06	0.08
No reason given beyond the shame itself	0.08	0.09	0.07

Notes: Shares of the 295 respondents (222 Upper/OBC, 73 EBC/SC) who said they would feel ashamed and gave a reason to the open-ended follow-up, coded by keyword. An answer may carry more than one reason, so shares do not sum to one. Italicized rows are the stigma reasons.

4 Experiment Design

The experiment varies the location of a fixed construction job to test whether workers are more willing to accept the job when it is less visible to their home community. This section describes recruitment and implementation, the three location treatments, and the variation used to identify the effect of occupational stigma on labor supply across locations.

4.1 Job Offers and Implementation

Section 3.1 describes the household sampling procedure, eligibility screen, and composition of the experimental sample. After completing the survey modules described in that section, eligible households proceeded to the job-offer experiment during the same visit. Surveyors explained before eliciting any choices that the offers could result in a referral to a job in construction.

Each respondent evaluated the same construction job at three locations:

(i) *Own village (V).* The worksite is located in the respondent's own village.

(ii) *Nearby panchayat (N).* The worksite is located in a village in a nearby panchayat.

(iii) *Patna (P).* The worksite is located in Patna, with travel costs paid separately from the daily wage.

Location therefore varies within respondent. Each offer describes a job in construction lasting five to ten days, with eight hours of work per day. The task, hours, duration, and wage schedule are held fixed across locations. At each location, respondents evaluate the job at daily wages of INR 550 and INR 600, both prevailing rates in Patna during the experiment. The analysis contains one observation for each of the six location–wage combinations per respondent.

Respondents report whether they would accept each offer if it were the only job available. They can accept several offers, all offers, or none; the task does not require them to choose a single preferred location. The order of the three locations is randomized across respondents, and a comprehension question verifies that respondents understand that each offer should be evaluated independently. The offer scripts do not mention caste, reputation, social observability, or the possibility of being observed.

After all choices had been recorded, one of the six location–wage offers was selected at random. Each respondent had a one-in-ten probability that the decision recorded for the selected offer would be implemented. If the respondent had accepted that offer, the survey team referred the eligible worker to the relevant contractor at the stated wage; if the offer had been declined, no referral was made. Because every location–wage choice could determine whether the worker received a referral, respondents had an incentive to report their willingness to accept each offer truthfully.

Respondents' choices translated into actual employment. In the village and labor-stand samples, respectively, 51 and 25 respondents had an accepted offer drawn and selected for implementation. Appendix Table B-12 documents the full implementation process, from offers and location-specific acceptance to the draw and job placement. These placements confirm that the choices we analyze were consequential, rather than hypothetical expressions of willingness to work.

The survey also measures how respondents perceive each work location. After all job choices, respondents report on a zero-to-ten scale the probability that people in their home village would learn that they were doing construction work at each location. We also collect location-specific ratings of payment reliability, work difficulty, and non-wage benefits. These measures allow us to examine whether relocating the job changes perceived exposure to the home community and whether changes in other job attributes differ across caste groups.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

Identification combines within-respondent variation in job location with between-group variation in the stigma attached to construction work. Based on the evidence in Section 3.2, we define $HS_i = 1$ for Upper/OBC respondents, the high-stigma group H in Section 2, and $HS_i = 0$ for EBC/SC respondents, the comparison group L. This caste grouping was pre-registered. It captures a difference in average stigma between the groups; it does not require every Upper/OBC respondent to face occupational stigma or every EBC/SC respondent to be free of it.

The primary comparison asks whether moving the same job from the own village to the nearby panchayat increases acceptance more among Upper/OBC respondents than among EBC/SC respondents. We compare the change in take-up within each group, rather than their levels of take-up at either location. This distinguishes differences in willingness to perform construction work locally from differences in the response to moving that work outside the village. The Patna offer extends the comparison to an urban destination.

Specification. We estimate the following offer-level specification:

$$T_{i\ell w} = \alpha + \beta_N N_\ell + \beta_P P_\ell + \gamma HS_i + \delta_N(N_\ell \times HS_i) + \delta_P(P_\ell \times HS_i) + \lambda W_w + \phi_v + \varepsilon_{i\ell w},$$

where $T_{i\ell w} = 1$ if respondent i accepts the offer at location ℓ and wage w. The indicators N_ℓ and P_ℓ denote the nearby-panchayat and Patna offers, and $W_w = 1$ denotes the INR 600 offer. The own-village location, EBC/SC group, and INR 550 wage are the omitted categories. We include respondent home-village fixed effects, ϕ_v, where v indexes the home village, and cluster standard errors by respondent.

For EBC/SC respondents, β_N is the change in take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers; for Upper/OBC respondents, that change is $\beta_N + \delta_N$. Their difference, δ_N, is the Upper/OBC-minus-EBC/SC difference in these changes and is our primary estimand. Similarly, β_P and $\beta_P + \delta_P$ are the two groups' changes in take-up between the own-village and Patna offers, and δ_P is the difference between them. The response to the INR 50 wage increase, λ, provides a local monetary scale for the location interactions: INR $50 \times \delta_\ell/\lambda$, for $\ell \in \{N, P\}$.

4.3 Identification and Supporting Evidence

We now connect the empirical comparisons to the framework in Section 2.4. We explain the conditions under which the nearby comparison identifies a causal effect of occupational stigma on labor supply, present the relevant survey evidence, and then develop the lower-bound interpretation of the city comparison.

Stigma and observability. The nearby offer is intended to reduce the probability that members of the respondent's home reference group learn about the construction work. Assumption 2 requires construction to carry a larger average stigma burden for Upper/OBC respondents. The predetermined caste classification and the pre-offer measures of own shame and local stigma pressure described in Section 3.2 provide evidence for this ordering. Assumption 1 requires work to be less visible to the home reference group as it moves farther from the village: within each caste group, average perceived observability must be highest for the own-village offer, lower for the nearby-panchayat offer, and no higher for the Patna offer.

Table 5 reports perceived observability across the three work locations. On the zero-to-ten scale, moving construction work from the own village to the nearby panchayat reduces perceived observability by 2.74 points among Upper/OBC respondents, from 9.05 to 6.31, and by 3.01 points among EBC/SC respondents, from 9.57 to 6.56. The village-to-nearby reduction differs across groups by -0.27 points ($p = 0.351$) and is not larger for the higher-stigma group. The city offer produces a larger reduction in both groups, and reported observability in Patna is nearly identical across groups. The group means therefore satisfy the ordering in Assumption 1.

Table 5: Perceived observability of construction work across locations, by caste group

	Upper/OBC		EBC/SC		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p
Work in own village	9.05	2.78	9.57	1.82	0.007
Work in nearby panchayat	6.31	3.70	6.56	3.61	0.441
Work in Patna	2.56	3.22	2.58	3.46	0.949

Notes: The table reports respondents' perceived likelihood that people in their own village would learn that they were doing the construction work at each location. Beliefs were elicited after all job choices on a scale from 0 (no chance) to 10 (certain). Higher values therefore indicate greater perceived observability to people in the respondent's own village. The final column reports two-sided p-values from tests of equality of group means within each location. The sample includes all experimental respondents with a nonmissing response for the corresponding location.

Other attributes of the nearby location. Although the stated job characteristics are held fixed, the contractor, worksite, and other non-observability attributes may differ between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers. Assumption 3 requires the resulting change in average non-social valuation to be the same for Upper/OBC and EBC/SC respondents, so that $\Delta q_N = 0$. Assumption 4 supplies a common affine mapping from offer value to acceptance. Together with Assumption 3, it implies that, absent occupational stigma, moving the job to the nearby panchayat would change average take-up equally across groups at each wage. The difference-in-differences then subtracts the change common to both groups and identifies their differential response to reduced social exposure.

We examine observable implications of the non-social valuation restriction using the location-specific ratings of payment reliability, work difficulty, and non-wage benefits. For each attribute, we estimate a specification containing indicators for location and caste group and their interactions. The coefficient on Nearby $\times$ Upper/OBC measures the between-group difference in the change in that attribute between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers. Table 6 reports differences of -0.004 scale points for payment reliability ($p = 0.974$), 0.037 points for work difficulty ($p = 0.602$), and 0.079 points for non-wage benefits ($p = 0.554$). All three estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The reported changes in these observed non-social attributes therefore do not differ systematically between Upper/OBC and EBC/SC respondents.

The city comparison. The city offer connects occupational stigma to migration by measuring willingness to accept the same construction job in Patna rather than in the respondent's own village. Working in the city also changes access to employers, networks, and future employment opportunities. The city–village difference-in-differences therefore combines the effect of reduced social observability with differential responses to these other attributes.

Together with the nearby identifying restrictions, Assumption 5 allows us to use the nearby-panchayat–village comparison as a lower bound on the stigma component of the city contrast. It

Table 6: Group differences in the valuation of non-social job attributes across locations

	Payment reliability (1)	Work difficulty (2)	Non-wage benefits (3)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	-0.004	0.037	0.079
	(0.139)	(0.072)	(0.133)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.063	-0.024	0.266
	(0.206)	(0.109)	(0.173)
Nearby panchayat	-0.133*	-0.003	-0.688***
	(0.076)	(0.039)	(0.075)
Patna	-0.181	0.204***	-0.310***
	(0.123)	(0.061)	(0.097)
Upper/OBC	-0.027	0.029	-0.061
	(0.161)	(0.029)	(0.052)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	3.17	0.00	0.00
Observations	3,254	3,296	3,282

Notes: The dependent variable is the respondent's rating of the stated attribute for the offer at that location. Payment reliability is reported for each location on a scale from 1 to 5, where higher values indicate greater confidence that the contractor pays in full and on time. Work difficulty and non-wage benefits are reported as comparisons with own-village work on a scale from -2 to $+2$, so they equal zero for the own-village offer by construction and their control means are zero. Higher values indicate work that is harder and benefits that are better than in their own village. The omitted categories are the own-village location and the EBC/SC group. Thus, Nearby × Upper/OBC is the Upper/OBC-minus-EBC/SC difference in the change in the rating between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers, and Patna × Upper/OBC is defined analogously. All columns include own-village fixed effects and are estimated on the offer rows used in Table 8. The control mean is the mean rating among EBC/SC respondents for the own-village offer. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

requires moving the job from the nearby panchayat to the city to reduce expected stigma costs at least as much for Upper/OBC respondents as for EBC/SC respondents. Under this condition, the stigma component of the city contrast is at least as large as the nearby-panchayat contrast.

We assess this condition using the observability evidence in Table 5 together with the pre-offer stigma evidence in Table 3. Reported observability falls from 6.31 in the nearby panchayat to 2.56 in Patna among Upper/OBC respondents, and from 6.56 to 2.58 among EBC/SC respondents. The further reduction in observability is therefore similar across groups, while the pre-offer measures indicate greater occupational stigma among Upper/OBC respondents. Together, these findings indicate that Assumption 5 holds. The measures provide evidence on the additional reduction in observability and the stigma burden, although the social penalty following discovery is not directly observed.

5 Results

We first present the acceptance rates and estimated location–caste interactions, including the city comparison that connects the spatial response to an urban destination. We then examine the stigma mechanism using measures collected before the offers, assess alternative explanations, and compare the village findings with evidence from construction workers recruited at urban labor stands.

5.1 Take-Up of the Job Offers

Raw acceptance rates. Table 7 reports unconditional acceptance rates. At INR 550, offering the construction work in the nearby panchayat rather than in their own village increases take-up by 10.6 ppt among Upper/OBC respondents, compared with a change of -1.5 points among EBC/SC respondents. The corresponding difference-in-differences is 12.2 ppt. At INR 600, the within-group changes are 13.1 and 1.2 ppt, yielding a difference-in-differences of 11.9 points. At both wages, take-up among EBC/SC respondents changes little, whereas the nearby offer substantially narrows the acceptance gap between the two groups. The city–village difference-in-differences is larger, ranging from 30.1 to 34.9 ppt across wages, although this comparison also incorporates group differences in the valuation of the urban destination.

Table 7: Raw acceptance rates across work locations, wages, and caste groups

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Own village, INR 550	0.678	565	0.489	188	0.774	376
Own village, INR 600	0.701	565	0.532	188	0.787	376
Nearby panchayat, INR 550	0.704	570	0.596	188	0.759	381
Nearby panchayat, INR 600	0.753	566	0.663	187	0.799	378
Patna, INR 550	0.568	567	0.612	188	0.548	378
Patna, INR 600	0.638	567	0.670	188	0.624	378
All six offers	0.674	3400	0.594	1127	0.715	2267

Notes: Each row reports the unconditional share of respondents accepting the construction job at the stated location and daily wage. Each location was first offered at INR 550; respondents who rejected that offer were subsequently offered INR 600. Respondents who accepted at INR 550 are coded as accepting the same job at INR 600. N is the number of respondents with a nonmissing choice in the corresponding location–wage cell. The final row pools the six location–wage cells and therefore reports offer-level, rather than respondent-level, observations. No controls are included.

Main estimates. Table 8 reports estimates of the offer-level specification in Section 4.2. The two location–caste interactions correspond to the two research questions. The coefficient δ_N measures the Upper/OBC-minus-EBC/SC difference in the change in take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers. The coefficient δ_P measures the corresponding difference between the

own-village and city offers. Column (2), which includes own-village fixed effects, is the preferred specification.

In the preferred specification, Upper/OBC respondents are 25.1 ppt less likely than EBC/SC respondents to accept construction work in their own village. Moving the same job to the nearby panchayat closes approximately half of this gap. Take-up among EBC/SC respondents changes little, while the increase among Upper/OBC respondents is 12.0 ppt larger ($\widehat{\delta}_N = 0.120$, $p < 0.001$). A substantial part of the local acceptance gap therefore disappears when the work moves outside the village, even though the job and wage remain fixed. This is the spatial pattern predicted by the framework: workers for whom construction is more stigmatized become more willing to perform it away from their home community. The larger nearby response among Upper/OBC respondents does not reflect a larger reported reduction in observability: Section 4.3 shows that this reduction is not greater for the higher-stigma group.

Under the identifying assumptions, δ_N measures the between-group difference in the effect of reduced social observability on labor supply. Using the estimated take-up response to the increase from INR 550 to INR 600, $\text{INR } 50 \times \widehat{\delta}_N/\widehat{\lambda}$ yields a wage equivalent of approximately INR 126 per day.[8]

The city comparison addresses the second research question: whether occupational stigma increases willingness to accept work at a migration destination. Column (2) gives $\widehat{\delta}_P = 0.325$ ($p < 0.001$), indicating that the change in take-up between the own-village and city offers is 32.5 ppt larger among Upper/OBC respondents than among EBC/SC respondents. The negative coefficient on City shows that take-up among EBC/SC respondents falls between the own-village and city offers. Among Upper/OBC respondents, the positive interaction more than offsets this decline, resulting in higher take-up for the city offer. This contrast combines stigma avoidance with differential responses to other attributes of the urban destination. Under the lower-bound interpretation developed in Section 4.3, the nearby estimate provides a lower bound on the stigma component of the city contrast. Occupational stigma therefore accounts for at least 12.0 ppt of the between-group difference in the change in take-up between the own-village and city offers.

Both interaction coefficients are robust to including Respondent fixed effects, a fixed effect for whether the respondent is a Proxy-Respondent, and controlling for education, age and assets of the individual interacted with location. Importantly, column 6 of Table 8 shows that the coefficients are stable to controlling for reported differences in payment reliability, work difficulty, and non-stigma benefits across locations. The nearby-panchayat interaction is also similar across wages (Appendix Table B-5).

Robustness. Including reported payment reliability, work difficulty, and non-wage benefits, separately or jointly, yields estimates of $\widehat{\delta}_N$ between 11.7 and 13.2 ppt (Appendix Table B-6). Restricting the sample to choices reported by respondents themselves (that is excluding proxy respon-

[8]This calculation assumes that the observed wage response provides a common linear approximation across groups and locations.

Table 8: Work location and job take-up: main estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.121***	0.120***	0.117***	0.120***	0.121***	0.122***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.325***	0.325***	0.321***	0.325***	0.319***	0.345***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Nearby	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.110**	0.019
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.049)	(0.014)
Patna	-0.195***	-0.194***	-0.191***	-0.194***	-0.202**	-0.185***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.083)	(0.024)
Upper/OBC	-0.270***	-0.251***		-0.256***	-0.238***	-0.249***
	(0.042)	(0.044)		(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Wage INR 600	0.048***	0.048***	0.047***	0.048***	0.048***	0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.781	0.781	0.781	0.781	0.781	0.783
Village FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Proxy-respondent FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Controls × place	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Location amenities	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,394	3,394	3,393	3,394	3,394	3,160

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. The table reports linear probability estimates of the specification in Section 4.2. The omitted categories are the own-village location, the EBC/SC group, and the INR 550 wage. Thus, Nearby × Upper/OBC is the Upper/OBC-minus-EBC/SC difference in the change in take-up between the own-village and nearby-panchayat offers; Patna × Upper/OBC is defined analogously. Column (1) includes no fixed effects; column (2) includes own-village fixed effects; column (3) includes respondent fixed effects, which absorb the Upper/OBC main effect; column (4) includes own-village and proxy-response fixed effects; column (5) additionally includes age, education, and the asset index, each interacted with location; and column (6) instead adds offer-specific ratings of payment reliability, relative benefits, and work difficulty. The control mean is mean acceptance across the two own-village wage cells among EBC/SC respondents in the estimation sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

dents) gives an estimate of 15.8 ppt, and allowing the location–caste coefficients to vary with offer order or proxy status produces similar results (Appendix Tables B-7 and B-8). These checks reduce concerns about observed amenities, reporting mode, and offer order.

The caste gradient. The framework predicts a larger spatial response among groups for whom construction carries a greater status cost. Appendix Table A-5 examines this prediction by estimating separate coefficients for OBC, EBC, and SC respondents. Relative to SC respondents, the nearby response is 13.3 ppt for OBC respondents and 3.2 ppt for EBC respondents. The OBC–EBC difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.003$), whereas the EBC–SC difference is less precisely estimated ($p = 0.197$). The city coefficients exhibit the same ordering. These estimates are consistent with a larger response to reduced observability among groups facing greater occupational stigma.

5.2 Mechanisms

Direct measures of stigma. Our hypothesis implies that the difference in labor supply for different locations should vary with direct measures of stigma. Table 9 examines this implication using two measures collected before respondents received the offers. Column 1 and 2 replace the caste classification variable in our main specification with a measure of self-reported shame and a standardized measure of second order belief about occupation stigma (local stigma pressure) respectively. The negative coefficients on own shame and local stigma pressure in column 1 and 2 shows that respondents reporting greater stigma are less likely to accept construction work in their own village. Respondents who report own shame exhibit a 24.8-ppt larger nearby-panchayat response ($p < 0.001$), and a one-standard-deviation increase in local stigma pressure is associated with a 7.7-ppt larger response ($p < 0.001$). The corresponding city interactions are positive and larger. The positive location interactions show that it is the stigmatized workers whose labor supply increases for offers outside the village compared to the less stigmatized workers.

Two further comparisons connect the caste pattern to measured stigma. First, columns (3) and (4) include caste classification and reported stigma together. Including own shame reduces $\widehat{\delta}_N$ from 12.0 to 4.6 ppt; including local stigma pressure reduces it to 6.3 ppt. The city–caste interaction also declines substantially, while the location–stigma interactions remain large. Second, column (5) examines variation within the EBC/SC group. Even within this lower-stigma caste category, respondents reporting shame exhibit a 19.2-ppt larger nearby response ($p < 0.001$). The same relationship between stigma and willingness to work outside the village therefore appears both across caste groups and within the lower-stigma group.

Perceived reduction in Observability. If workers value reducing the social observability of a stigmatized job, then labor supply should rise with the reduction in observability a location is believed to provide. Table 10 examines this implication using the observability beliefs. Column 1 adds to the main specification the reported observability of own-village work minus the reported observability of work at the offered location, standardized across offer-level observations. Column 2 interacts this measure with the Upper/OBC indicator, testing whether the same perceived reduction is valued differently across the two groups. Columns 3 and 4 instead allow take-up at each location to vary with the respondent's reported reduction in observability at that location. Specifically, the reported reduction in observability from the village to the nearby location is interacted with the nearby indicator, while the reduction from the village to Patna is interacted with the Patna indicator; both measures are standardized across respondents. Column 3 includes only these interactions, testing whether reported reductions in observability can account for the observed location pattern on their own. Column 4 additionally includes the Upper/OBC indicator and its interactions with location, testing whether the location–caste interactions persist after controlling for each respondent's own reported reductions in observability.

A one-standard-deviation increase in the perceived reduction in observability is associated with a 4.9-ppt increase in take-up (column 1). The gradient does not differ by caste: its interac-

Table 9: Direct measures of occupational stigma and spatial job take-up

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nearby × own shame	0.248***		0.230***		0.192***
	(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.051)
Patna × own shame	0.517***		0.448***		0.258***
	(0.053)		(0.056)		(0.080)
Nearby × local stigma pressure		0.077***		0.064***	
		(0.015)		(0.014)	
Patna × local stigma pressure		0.201***		0.160***	
		(0.025)		(0.026)	
Nearby × Upper/OBC			0.046*	0.063**	
			(0.023)	(0.025)	
Patna × Upper/OBC			0.180***	0.193***	
			(0.047)	(0.049)	
Nearby	-0.023***	0.051***	-0.034***	0.028**	-0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Patna	-0.215***	-0.055**	-0.258***	-0.126***	-0.231***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Own shame	-0.452***		-0.410***		-0.309***
	(0.044)		(0.047)		(0.071)
Local stigma pressure		-0.120***		-0.084***	
		(0.022)		(0.023)	
Upper/OBC			-0.124***	-0.182***	
			(0.043)	(0.047)	
Wage INR 600	0.048***	0.047***	0.048***	0.048***	0.043***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Own-village control mean	0.807	0.695	0.781	0.785	0.824
Caste interactions included	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Sample	All	All	All	All	EBC/SC
Observations	3,394	3,337	3,388	3,331	2,267

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. Own shame is a pre-choice indicator equal to one if the respondent reports that they would feel shame doing construction work in their own village. Local stigma pressure is the standardized reverse of the ten-workers measure described in Section 3; higher values indicate that fewer members of the respondent's caste are expected to perform construction work in view of the village. Columns (1) and (2) include one stigma measure and its interactions with the nearby and Patna indicators. Columns (3) and (4) additionally include the Upper/OBC indicator and its location interactions. Column (5) estimates the own-shame specification within the EBC/SC sample. The own village is the omitted location in every column. All specifications include own-village fixed effects and the INR 600 wage indicator. The control mean is mean acceptance across the two own-village wage cells for the omitted group in each column: respondents reporting no shame in columns (1) and (5), the full estimation sample in column (2), where the moderator is continuous and standardized, and EBC/SC respondents in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

tion with the Upper/OBC indicator is 1.6 ppt ($p = 0.647$). In the location-specific specifications, larger perceived observability reductions are associated with greater take-up of both the nearby-panchayat and city offers, and including them leaves both location–caste interactions nearly unchanged; in particular, $\widehat{\delta}_N = 12.2$ ppt in column 4. The two groups therefore respond to a given reduction in observability similarly, and the spatial differences in take-up do not reflect systematically larger perceived observability reductions among Upper/OBC respondents.

Table 10: Perceived reductions in observability and job take-up

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.122***	0.111***		0.122***
	(0.027)	(0.037)		(0.027)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.328***	0.300***		0.328***
	(0.048)	(0.077)		(0.048)
Reduction in observability (SD)	0.049***	0.044**		
	(0.016)	(0.020)		
Reduction in observability (SD) × Upper/OBC		0.016		
		(0.036)		
Nearby × own nearby reduction (SD)			0.039**	0.037**
			(0.017)	(0.017)
Patna × own Patna reduction (SD)			0.048**	0.049**
			(0.020)	(0.020)
Nearby	-0.038**	-0.034*	0.038***	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Patna	-0.281***	-0.272***	-0.088***	-0.198***
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Upper/OBC	-0.252***	-0.239***		-0.252***
	(0.044)	(0.053)		(0.044)
Wage INR 600	0.048***	0.048***	0.047***	0.048***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Own-village control mean	0.781	0.781	0.689	0.781
Caste interactions included	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,394	3,394	3,400	3,394

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. For each respondent and work location, the reduction in observability is the reported observability of own-village work minus the reported observability of work at that location; it equals zero for the own-village offer and is positive when work elsewhere is perceived as less visible. Columns (1) and (2) use a single measure standardized across offer-level observations; column (2) additionally interacts that measure with the Upper/OBC indicator. Columns (3) and (4) instead standardize the village-to-nearby and village-to-Patna observability gaps separately across respondents and interact each gap with its corresponding location indicator. Column (3) excludes caste terms, while column (4) includes the Upper/OBC indicator and its location interactions. All specifications include own-village fixed effects and the INR 600 wage indicator. The control mean is mean acceptance across the two own-village wage cells for the omitted group in each column: EBC/SC respondents in columns (1), (2), and (4), and the full estimation sample in column (3), which contains no caste terms and whose moderators are continuous and standardized. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Stated reasons. Open-ended explanations provide additional descriptive evidence on the considerations underlying respondents' choices. Among respondents who decline an offer visible within their own village, Upper/OBC respondents are 35.5 ppt more likely than EBC/SC respondents to mention being observed; the corresponding EBC/SC mean is 8.1 percent. Among those who accept work outside their own village, Upper/OBC respondents are 8.2 ppt more likely to cite concealment, relative to a mean of 1.7 percent (Appendix Table A-6). Disaggregated responses indicate that Upper/OBC respondents refer particularly to taunts from village residents and caste peers, whereas EBC/SC respondents more frequently cite wages and other practical considerations (Appendix Tables A-7 and A-8). Although these responses do not constitute separately identified causal effects, their content is consistent with the proposed stigma mechanism rather than a general preference for working elsewhere.

Preference rankings. Preference rankings provide additional evidence from respondents whose binary choices do not vary across locations. Among these respondents, 13.7 percent of Upper/OBC respondents rank the city offer first and the own-village offer last, compared with 5.8 percent of EBC/SC respondents (Appendix Figure A-1). The same spatial ordering appears in the full sample: the corresponding shares are 24.0 and 5.7 percent (Appendix Figure A-2). Thus, even when binary take-up is identical across locations, respondents' rankings reveal a preference ordering consistent with the predicted spatial pattern.

External and internalized costs of stigma. The results point to an external component of occupational stigma. Upper/OBC respondents are more willing to accept the same construction job when it is offered outside their own village, where the work is less visible to people in their social network. This response differs from an internalized aversion to the job itself, which would affect labor supply regardless of where the job is performed. Our experiment does not imply that such internalized costs are absent. Rather, by holding the job and wage fixed across locations, it identifies the additional cost created by performing the job where it is more likely to become known.

This distinction helps relate our findings to Oh (2023). Oh documents an internalized cost of performing manual tasks associated with the traditional occupations of other castes, beyond a general aversion to manual work. The construction job in our experiment is not the traditional occupation of any particular caste in our setting. A caste-associated job could therefore impose an identity cost in addition to the visibility-dependent cost identified here. Evidence from Oh's public treatment is consistent with these mechanisms coexisting. Publicly disclosing workers' choices reduces labor supply for manual control tasks, but does not further increase the penalty for caste-associated tasks. Visibility thus appears to affect the general status cost of manual work, while the additional cost of caste-incongruent work remains largely internalized.

5.3 Alternative Explanations

Familiarity with the city. One possible concern is that respondents differ in how familiar they are with the city of Patna. Such differences could affect the response to the Patna offer. Prior work experience in Patna is common in both groups: 72 percent of Upper/OBC respondents and 72 percent of EBC/SC respondents report having worked there. The results are also similar when we allow the location effects to vary with prior city experience or migration history (Appendix Table B-9).

Wealth rather than stigma. Another possible explanation is that differences in wealth drive the caste pattern in labor supply. Wealth may affect the overall willingness to take up work, but it would explain the spatial pattern only if it also changes how respondents value jobs across locations. We therefore allow the effects of assets, education, and age to vary by location. Doing so leaves both $\widehat{\delta}_N$ and $\widehat{\delta}_P$ largely unchanged (Table 8, column 5). We also find no systematic relationship between wealth and the spatial response within caste groups (Appendix Table B-10).

Selection into the experimental sample. As described in Section 3, we select only those households for the experiment who had worked recently in manual labor over the past year. The questions on stigma are asked to a broader randomly selected sample which includes households who had not worked in construction in the recent past. A possible concern with our experimental estimates might be that the eligibility criteria selected Upper/OBC households with unusually high levels of stigma. If so, the estimated spatial interactions could partly reflect this selection rather than a broader caste difference in the response to work location. The data do not support this concern. Among Upper/OBC households, those excluded from the experiment are 14.8 ppt more likely to report shame about doing construction work in their own village than those who were retained. The other measures of stigma are also similar across the two groups (Appendix Table B-1). This shows that the screening process did not selectively retain Upper/OBC households with especially high measured stigma.

5.4 Replication at Urban Labor Stands

We next examine whether the same spatial pattern appears among workers recruited directly from the urban construction labor market. This sample consists of 236 construction workers recruited in the labor stands of Patna. We restrict the sampling to workers who live in rural areas close to Patna and migrate to the city regularly to look for work. Because these workers are already searching for construction work in the city, their choices provide a particularly useful comparison of willingness to do the same work across locations, including in their own village.

The labor supply results closely resemble those in the village sample. The difference-in-differences is $\widehat{\delta}_P = 0.408$ ($p < 0.001$) for the own-village and city comparison (Table 11). The nearby-village interaction is 8.3 ppt ($p = 0.042$). Its sign and magnitude are similar to the estimate in the village

sample, although the smaller sample makes this estimate less precise.

The mechanism evidence also parallels the village results. Among Upper/OBC workers, 53 percent report shame about doing construction work in their own village, compared with 19 percent of EBC/SC workers. The two caste groups report similar levels of perceived observability at each location. However, among workers who perceive a larger reduction in observability between the village and Patna, the increase in take-up for the Patna offer is also larger (Appendix Tables A-11 and A-14).

Three differences between the labor-stand estimates in Table 11 and the village estimates in Table 8 are informative about selection into migration and its implications for our estimates. First, Upper/OBC labor supply in the village is 38.6 ppt lower than EBC/SC labor supply in the village in the labor-stand sample, compared with a 25.1 ppt gap in the village sample. This larger gap is consistent with selection into migration: Upper/OBC workers who face greater social costs from performing construction work in their own village are more likely to leave the village labor market and work in Patna.

Second, EBC/SC workers respond differently to the Patna offer across the two samples. In the village sample, offering the job in Patna rather than in the respondent's own village reduces EBC/SC take-up by 19.4 ppt. Among EBC/SC workers recruited at labor stands in Patna, by contrast, take-up does not decline when the job is offered in Patna. This difference is consistent with the composition of the labor-stand sample. These workers have already migrated to Patna for construction work and have therefore already incurred or overcome the travel costs, unfamiliarity, and other barriers that make work in Patna less attractive to respondents recruited in villages.

Third, the response to the nearby location also differs across the two samples. Among EBC/SC respondents in the village sample, offering the job in the nearby panchayat rather than in the respondent's own village has little effect on take-up. Among EBC/SC workers in the labor-stand sample, the same comparison increases take-up by 7.1 ppt. Thus, even within the EBC/SC group, workers who have migrated to Patna are more willing to perform the same work outside their own village than within it, a pattern consistent with selection on stigma. Take-up at the nearby location reaches 90 percent among these workers, leaving little scope for a further increase. The small nearby interaction in the labor-stand sample therefore partly reflects this ceiling in take-up.

The ranking data provide a way to recover these preferences even when take-up is at the ceiling. After the job offers, each worker ranks the three locations by naming the offer they liked most and the one they liked second best. Because workers who accept all three offers must still rank them, this outcome reveals relative preferences that take-up alone cannot. Table 12 estimates the specification in Table 11 using this ranking as the outcome, assigning a score of 3 to the most-preferred location, 2 to the second, and 1 to the last. Relative to the own-village offer, Upper/OBC workers rank the nearby offer 0.45 points higher than EBC/SC workers do ($p < 0.001$), and the Patna offer 1.22 points higher ($p < 0.001$). The muted nearby interaction in take-up therefore reflects, at least in part, the ceiling in acceptance rather than the absence of a preference for working outside the own village.

Table 11: Work location and job take-up among workers recruited at Patna labor stands

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.083**	0.083**	0.083**	0.088**	0.081*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.408***	0.408***	0.408***	0.403***	0.370***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Nearby	0.071***	0.071***	0.071***	0.045	0.069***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.097)	(0.026)
Patna	0.009	0.009	0.009	-0.032	0.009
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.144)	(0.042)
Upper/OBC	-0.386***	-0.393***		-0.389***	-0.368***
	(0.057)	(0.059)		(0.056)	(0.057)
Wage INR 600	0.080***	0.080***	0.080***	0.079***	0.080***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.832	0.832	0.832	0.830	0.830
Labour-stand FE	No	Yes	No	No	No
Respondent FE	No	No	Yes	No	No
Controls × place	No	No	No	Yes	No
Location amenities	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,398	1,398	1,398	1,392	1,376

Notes: The sample consists of construction workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands who completed the six location–wage choices used in the main experiment. The dependent variable equals one if a worker accepts an offer. The omitted categories are the own-village location, the EBC/SC group, and the INR 550 wage. The location–Upper/OBC interactions therefore measure group differences in the change in take-up relative to the own-village offer. Column (1) includes no fixed effects. Own-village fixed effects are not feasible in this sample because workers come from nearly as many own villages as there are respondents. Column (2) includes labor-stand fixed effects; column (3) includes respondent fixed effects, which absorb the Upper/OBC main effect; column (4) adds age, education, and an asset index, each interacted with location; and column (5) adds offer-specific ratings of payment reliability, relative benefits, and work difficulty. The control mean is mean acceptance across the two own-village wage cells among EBC/SC workers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by worker. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Work location and the ranking of the three offers among workers recruited at Patna labor stands

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.453***	0.485***	0.452***
	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Patna × Upper/OBC	1.223***	1.281***	1.153***
	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.209)
Nearby	-0.553***	-0.720**	-0.596***
	(0.088)	(0.280)	(0.084)
Patna	-1.211***	-1.418***	-1.278***
	(0.138)	(0.449)	(0.132)
Upper/OBC	-0.559***	-0.589***	-0.553***
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	2.588	2.607	2.607
Controls × place	No	Yes	No
Location amenities	No	No	Yes
Workers	234	232	232
Observations	702	696	688

Notes: After responding to the six offers, each worker names the offer they liked most and the one they liked second best. Each worker contributes one observation per location. The dependent variable is the score of that location: 3 if the worker liked its offer most, 2 if second, and 1 if last. The three scores therefore sum to 6 for every worker. The ranking is asked once, after the six offers, so the wage does not enter. The omitted categories are the own-village location and the EBC/SC group. Because the scores sum to a constant within a worker, labor-stand and respondent fixed effects leave the location coefficients unchanged and are not reported. Column (1) includes no controls; column (2) adds age, education, and an asset index, each interacted with location; and column (3) adds ratings of payment reliability, relative benefits, and work difficulty for that location. The control mean is the mean score of the own-village offer among EBC/SC workers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by worker. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6 Experiment with Urban Youth

We next ask whether our hypothesis extends beyond caste and manual labor to an urban labor market where education provides another source of social standing. In Patna, we study young men's willingness to take app-based delivery jobs in their own and adjacent neighbourhoods, alongside an office-based call-centre job. Delivery work provides a useful test because educated men may see it as falling short of the standing they expect their qualifications to bring. Comparing the same delivery job across neighbourhoods allows us to examine whether working away from the people who know a respondent changes his willingness to accept it, and whether this response is larger among more educated men.

6.1 Sample and Recruitment

Surveyors approached men individually in parks and other public places in Patna. A short oral screen determined eligibility. Men were eligible if they were older than 21, had completed at least grade 10, and lived in Patna, either because they were from the city or because they had lived there for more than a month. The analysis sample contains 289 men.

We divide respondents into two education groups. The higher-education group includes 157 men who studied beyond grade 12, all of whom hold at least a bachelor's degree. The comparison group includes 132 men with grade 12 or below. Following the framework in Section 2, we expect the higher-education group to face greater occupational stigma from delivery work.

Table 13 reports the characteristics of both groups. Respondents average 27 years of age and 13.4 years of schooling. 31 percent attend a college, an industrial training institute, or a coaching center, and 43 percent are not working. The groups are similar in age and caste composition. Men in the higher-education group are more likely to hold salaried jobs and to be looking for work. They also score higher on the composite status index.

6.2 Design

Respondents consider three hypothetical jobs, each initially offered at INR 18,000 in monthly take-home earnings:

(i) *Call-centre job.* Working inside an office in the city, answering customers' calls, for a fixed monthly salary.

(ii) *Delivery, own neighbourhood.* Delivering goods to people's homes on a motorcycle through an app, in the respondent's own neighbourhood.

(iii) *Delivery, next neighbourhood.* The same delivery job in the neighbourhood next to the respondent's own.

For delivery work, earnings are stated net of petrol and other travel costs. Respondents who decline a job at INR 18,000 are offered the same job at INR 20,000. In the analysis, respondents

Table 13: Characteristics of respondents, by education

	Less educated			More educated		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Age (years)	25.98	5.36	132	27.17	5.21	157
Education (years)	11.26	0.95	132	15.25	0.68	157
Currently studying	0.37	0.48	132	0.46	0.50	157
Enrolled at an ITI, college or coaching centre	0.36	0.48	132	0.27	0.45	157
Not working now (studying, or looking)	0.38	0.49	132	0.46	0.50	157
In a salaried job now	0.24	0.43	132	0.37	0.48	157
Currently looking for work	0.24	0.43	132	0.49	0.50	157
Looking for a government or salaried job	0.69	0.47	32	0.79	0.41	77
Months spent looking for work	12.75	19.01	32	25.05	32.84	77
Married	0.33	0.47	126	0.27	0.44	154
Muslim	0.11	0.32	126	0.03	0.18	154
Upper/OBC caste group	0.81	0.39	121	0.76	0.43	150
Months living in Patna (if moved there)	48.84	75.34	69	51.24	69.06	78
Owns their home	0.39	0.49	129	0.41	0.49	155
Household monthly income (INR)	51069.44	57768.13	108	59556.52	83736.03	115
Household owns a motorcycle or scooter	0.78	0.42	126	0.84	0.37	154
Household owns a four-wheeler	0.12	0.33	126	0.27	0.44	154
Someone in the household owns a smartphone	0.96	0.20	126	1.00	0.00	154
Father's main work is manual labour	0.03	0.17	129	0.03	0.18	148
Composite status index (std)	-0.58	0.82	132	0.49	0.87	157

Notes: More educated denotes men who studied beyond class 12 and less educated denotes men with class 12 or less. The sample is all consenting respondents. Questions on job search type and months spent looking are asked only of respondents currently looking for work, and months living in Patna only of respondents who are not from Patna. Caste and household items are asked in the last section of the survey and are missing for respondents who stopped earlier or declined to answer. Household income is top-coded at the 99th percentile. The composite status index is the standardized mean of years of schooling, household income, and household ownership of a four-wheeler and of a motorcycle or scooter.

who accept at INR 18,000 are also coded as accepting at INR 20,000. Respondents are randomly assigned to hear the call-centre job either before or after both delivery offers. As in the village experiment, they evaluate each job independently, as if it were the only job available.

The two delivery offers hold the task and earnings fixed while varying the work location. This comparison follows the logic of the village experiment: work in the own neighbourhood is more likely to be observed by people whose opinions matter to the respondent. The call-centre offer provides a separate comparison across occupations.

Unlike the village experiment, these offers are hypothetical. Before presenting them, surveyors explain that the jobs are not real and that respondents will not receive a job through the survey. We make no referrals. The choices therefore measure stated rather than incentivized willingness to work.

Before presenting the offers, surveyors ask respondents about occupational stigma. Respondents rate how much hesitation, reluctance, or shame they would feel doing each job on a scale from 1 to 10. They then consider a friend doing each job and rate how much people in the friend's neighbourhood would talk behind his back if they learned about his work, on a scale from 1 to

5. Respondents also report whether workers in each occupation sometimes hide their work from others and which job their household and society respect more.

Hypothesis If the social cost of delivery work depends on whether people who know the respondent see him doing it, respondents should be more willing to accept the next-neighbourhood offer than the own-neighbourhood offer. This difference should be larger among more educated men if they face greater occupational stigma. We also compare willingness to accept delivery and call-centre work to examine preferences across occupations. The occupation comparison uses respondent fixed effects and allows the difference in acceptance to vary with education. Our central test compares the delivery offers across locations:

$$T_{ijw} = \alpha + \beta\, Next_j + \gamma E_i + \delta\,(Next_j \times E_i) + \lambda W_w + \varepsilon_{ijw},$$

where $T_{ijw} = 1$ if respondent i accepts delivery offer j at wage w, $Next_j = 1$ for the next-neighbourhood offer, $E_i = 1$ if the respondent studied beyond class 12, and $W_w = 1$ for the INR 20,000 offer. The own neighbourhood, men with class 12 or less, and the INR 18,000 wage are the omitted categories. The coefficient β measures the difference in acceptance between the next- and own-neighbourhood offers among less educated men. The coefficient δ measures how much larger this difference is among more educated men. It is our primary estimand and corresponds to δ_N in the village experiment. Interpreting δ as a stigma effect uses the analogues of Assumptions 3 and 4. We assume that the two education groups assign the same average non-stigma value to moving delivery work to the next neighbourhood and that acceptance follows a common affine response to offer value over the relevant range. Together, these restrictions imply that, without the exposure-dependent social penalty, moving the delivery job would change average take-up equally across the two education groups.

6.3 Results

6.3.1 Reported Stigma Across Jobs

Table 14 tests whether delivery work carries more stigma than the call-centre job, and whether that difference is larger for men who are more educated. Respondents report more stigma about delivery work on every measure. On the ten-point scale, own shame averages 3.3 for delivery work against 2.0 for the call-centre job, a gap of 1.3 points ($p < 0.001$). On the five-point scale, respondents expect people to talk behind a friend's back more if the friend does delivery work, 2.39 against 1.49 ($p < 0.001$). 49 percent believe that people who do delivery work sometimes hide it, compared with 18 percent for call-centre work ($p < 0.001$), and 84 percent say their household and society respect call-centre work more.

The reasons respondents give for hiding delivery work point to social disapproval rather than a preference for privacy (Appendix Table D-1). Among respondents who believe the work is hidden, 49 percent say that people will talk about or make fun of it and 42 percent say that people do

not consider it good work. When asked whom such work is hidden from, 72 percent name neighbours or people in the neighbourhood. This suggests that the disapproval respondents expect comes largely from the people who would observe the work in their own neighbourhood.

The next-neighbourhood offer reduces, but does not remove, that observability. On average, respondents expect 59 percent of their own neighbourhood to learn of delivery work done in the next neighbourhood. The comparison between the two delivery offers therefore captures only part of the value of working entirely out of view.

The stated stigma of delivery work differs little by education. The shame gap is 1.1 points among men with class 12 or less and 1.5 points among men above class 12 ($p = 0.321$ for the difference), and the talk gap is 0.85 against 0.94 ($p = 0.536$). The point estimates for all three gaps are larger for men above class 12, but none of the differences is statistically significant. The survey measures therefore provide only weak direct evidence for the stigma ordering in Assumption 2.

Table 14: Stigma of delivery and call-centre work, by education

	All	Less educated	More educated	Difference
Panel A: Own shame doing the work (1–10)				
Call-centre job	1.99	1.92	2.05	0.13
Delivery job	3.31	3.06	3.52	0.46
Gap: delivery minus call centre	1.32***	1.14***	1.47***	0.33
Panel B: People would talk behind a friend's back (1–5)				
Call-centre job	1.49	1.34	1.61	0.27***
Delivery job	2.39	2.19	2.56	0.37**
Gap: delivery minus call centre	0.90***	0.85***	0.94***	0.09
Panel C: Concealment, respect, and observability				
Thinks people hide call-centre work	0.18	0.14	0.21	0.07
Thinks people hide delivery work	0.49	0.44	0.54	0.09
Gap: delivery minus call centre	0.31***	0.30***	0.32***	0.02
Neighbourhood respects call-centre work more	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.01
Share of neighbourhood that would find out	0.59	0.58	0.59	0.00

Notes: Panel A reports how much hesitation, reluctance, or shame respondents would feel doing each job, rated from 1 (none) to 10 (a great deal). Panel B reports how much people in a friend's neighbourhood would talk behind the friend's back if they learned that the friend did the job, rated from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). In Panel C, the first three rows report the share of respondents who believe that people who do each job sometimes avoid telling others about it or say they do other work; the fourth row reports the share who say their household and society respect call-centre work more than delivery work; and the fifth row reports the expected share of people in the respondent's own neighbourhood who would learn of delivery work done in the next neighbourhood, elicited on a scale from 0 to 10 and divided by 10. The last measure is asked after the job offers; all others are asked before them. Gap rows report the within-respondent difference between the two jobs; stars in the first three columns are from paired t-tests against zero. The final column reports the difference between more- and less-educated men, with stars from two-sample t-tests. More educated denotes men who studied beyond class 12 and less educated denotes men with class 12 or less. The sample is all respondents who reached the stigma questions. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: Job, work location, and take-up among urban youth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Delivery work compared with the call-centre job					
Delivery work × More educated		-0.081	-0.089		
		(0.062)	(0.061)		
Delivery work (vs call centre)	-0.178***	-0.134***	-0.130***		
	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.047)		
More educated			-0.012		
			(0.049)		
Wage INR 20,000	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***		
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Control mean (less educated)	0.791	0.791	0.791		
Worker FE	Yes	Yes	No		
Controls × job	No	No	Yes		
Observations	1,692	1,692	1,692		
Panel B: Next neighbourhood compared with own neighbourhood, delivery offers only					
Next neighbourhood × More educated			0.096**	0.096**	0.091*
			(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Next neighbourhood (vs own neighbourhood)	0.147***	0.147***	0.094***	0.094***	0.098***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.035)
More educated			-0.139**	-0.149**	-0.162**
			(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.063)
Wage INR 20,000	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Control mean (less educated)	0.610	0.610	0.610	0.610	0.625
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attribute beliefs	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,128	1,128	1,128	1,128	936

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts an offer. Panel A uses all six offers; delivery work equals one for either delivery offer, and the call-centre job is the omitted category. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A include respondent fixed effects, which absorb the education main effect; column (3) drops the respondent fixed effects and adds age and its interaction with delivery work. Panel B uses the four delivery offers; the own neighbourhood is the omitted location. Columns (2) and (4) of Panel B add age and its interaction with the next-neighbourhood indicator; column (5) additionally adds the respondent's ratings of the earnings stability, job security, and chances of promotion of delivery work, which are asked after the job offers. Age is centered at the sample mean. Less-educated men and the INR 18,000 wage are the omitted categories throughout. More educated denotes men who studied beyond class 12 and less educated denotes men with class 12 or less. The control mean is acceptance of the call-centre job in Panel A and of the own-neighbourhood delivery job in Panel B, among less-educated men. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6.3.2 Labor Supply for Job Offers

Delivery work and the call-centre job. Panel A of Table 15 shows that respondents are less willing to accept delivery work than the call-centre job. The within-respondent difference, measured

as delivery minus call-centre acceptance, is -17.8 ppt ($p < 0.001$; column 1). This difference is -13.4 points among less educated men and -21.5 points among more educated men (column 2). The between-group difference is -8.1 points and is not statistically significant ($p = 0.193$). The location comparison below holds the occupation fixed, allowing us to examine whether willingness to accept delivery work changes when it is offered outside the respondent's own neighbourhood.

Work location. Panel B compares acceptance of delivery work across locations, holding the job and earnings fixed. Pooling the two earnings levels, acceptance is 14.7 percentage points higher for the next-neighbourhood offer ($p < 0.001$; column 1). This difference is 9.4 points among less educated men ($p = 0.003$) and 19.0 points among more educated men ($p < 0.001$). The resulting difference-in-differences is $\widehat{\delta} = 9.6$ percentage points ($p = 0.034$; column 3): the increase in acceptance is about twice as large among more educated men. These men are less willing to accept delivery work in their own neighbourhood, and the next-neighbourhood offer closes most of this education gap. The estimate remains similar across specifications, ranging from 9.1 to 9.6 points. This pattern parallels the village experiment: the group expected to face greater occupational stigma exhibits the larger increase in willingness to accept the same work outside its own community.

Direct measures of stigma. We next examine whether respondents who report greater occupational stigma exhibit a larger difference in acceptance between the two locations. Table 16 replaces education in the delivery-offer specification with the two stigma measures collected before the offers. Both measures show the predicted pattern. A one-point increase in reported shame is associated with 8.6 percentage points lower acceptance of the own-neighbourhood offer ($p < 0.001$) and a 2.7-point larger difference between next- and own-neighbourhood acceptance ($p < 0.001$; column 1). A one-point increase in expected criticism is associated with 7.2 points lower own-neighbourhood acceptance ($p < 0.001$) and a 3.2-point larger location difference ($p = 0.038$; column 2). Respondents who report greater stigma are therefore particularly reluctant to accept delivery work in their own neighbourhood. Column 3 includes reported shame and education together. The shame interaction remains 2.6 points ($p = 0.001$), while the education interaction declines only slightly, from 9.6 to 8.4 points ($p = 0.057$).

Additional results and robustness The ranking of the three jobs, which respondents give after all six offers, shows the same pattern. The ranking has an advantage over binary take-up: it orders the jobs even for respondents who accept or reject every offer. 59 percent of more educated men rank the next-neighbourhood delivery job above the own-neighbourhood one, compared with 43 percent of less educated men ($p = 0.014$). In a regression on the rank score, the education difference in the preference for the next neighbourhood over the own neighbourhood is 0.33 points ($p = 0.028$; Appendix Table D-3). The composite status index, which combines education with income and assets, yields a positive but imprecise interaction of 3.5 ppt per standard deviation

Table 16: Direct measures of stigma and the response to work location

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Next neighbourhood × own shame	0.027***		0.026***
	(0.008)		(0.008)
Next neighbourhood × people would talk		0.032**	
		(0.016)	
Next neighbourhood × More educated			0.084*
			(0.044)
Next neighbourhood (vs own neighbourhood)	0.058**	0.064	0.015
	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.033)
Own shame doing delivery work (1–10)	-0.086***		-0.085***
	(0.006)		(0.006)
People would talk about delivery work (1–5)		-0.072***	
		(0.021)	
More educated			-0.102**
			(0.050)
Wage INR 20,000	0.012**	0.013**	0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control mean (own neighbourhood)	0.534	0.532	0.610
Stigma measure	Own shame	People would talk	Own shame
Education interaction included	No	No	Yes
Respondents	282	277	282
Observations	1,128	1,108	1,128

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a delivery offer. The sample is the four delivery offers; the own neighbourhood is the omitted location. Own shame is rated from 1 (none) to 10 (a great deal); the second measure is how much people in a friend's neighbourhood would talk behind the friend's back if they learned that the friend did delivery work, rated from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). Both are asked before the job offers. Column (1) includes own shame and its interaction with the next-neighbourhood indicator; column (2) does the same for the second measure; column (3) adds the education indicator and its interaction to column (1). All columns include the INR 20,000 wage indicator. The control mean is acceptance of the own-neighbourhood offer among all respondents in columns (1) and (2) and among less-educated men in column (3). More educated denotes men who studied beyond class 12 and less educated denotes men with class 12 or less. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

($p = 0.121$; Appendix Table D-4).

Discussion The urban experiment finds a similar pattern to the village experiment in a different population, occupation, and status hierarchy. Young men in Patna are more willing to accept delivery work one neighbourhood away than in their own neighbourhood at the same pay. This difference is larger among more educated men, who may view delivery work as beneath their social standing, and among respondents who report greater occupational stigma. These findings suggest that concerns about being seen doing low-status work extend beyond caste and construction work in villages to urban service work and status associated with education. Because the offers are hypothetical, the results concern stated willingness to work rather than actual job accep-

tance.

7 Conclusion

This paper studies how occupational stigma shapes labor supply and migration. We offered 582 workers in rural Bihar the same construction job in three locations: their own village, a village in a nearby panchayat, and the city. We held the task, hours, and wage schedule fixed across locations. Changing the location varied how visible the work was to the worker's own community, while the empirical design accounts for other attributes that also vary across locations.

Occupational stigma reduces willingness to accept work within one's own community. For jobs in the respondent's own village, take-up among Upper/OBC respondents, the higher-stigma group, is 25.1 ppt lower than among EBC/SC respondents. Moving the same job to a nearby panchayat closes roughly half of this gap: take-up rises by 12.0 ppt more among Upper/OBC respondents. Scaling this differential response by the observed wage response gives a wage equivalent of approximately INR 126 per day for the greater benefit Upper/OBC respondents obtain from moving construction work outside their own village.

Several findings link this spatial response to occupational stigma. The two caste groups report similar reductions in observability across locations, while direct measures of stigma predict the response both across and within caste groups. The same pattern appears among migrant construction workers recruited at labor stands in Patna. These workers already perform construction work in the city but are less willing to accept the same work in their own villages. Together, these findings show that the social cost of an occupation depends on where workers perform it and who can observe them.

An experiment with urban youth extends this evidence beyond caste and construction work. In a hypothetical survey experiment with young men in Patna, shifting an identical app-based delivery job outside the respondent's own neighbourhood raises stated willingness to accept it by 9.6 ppt more among men who are more educated than among those who are less educated.

These findings identify a social margin of labor supply: workers value a job not only for its wage and tasks but also for the stigma that they impose on them. Working away from home can separate an occupation from the worker's reference group that stigmatizes that occupation. A nearby worksite can make the same job more attractive without requiring a change of residence; when less visible work is available only farther away, the same mechanism creates an incentive to migrate (Fan and Stark, 2011). Occupational stigma thus connects the willingness to work locally with the incentive to seek employment elsewhere.

These findings have implications for interpreting occupational choices and designing employment opportunities. A worker's refusal of a local job can coexist with willingness to perform the same occupation elsewhere, while participation away from home can coexist with substantial stigma in the home community. Local job refusals therefore provide an incomplete measure of willingness to supply labor to an occupation. For employers and employment programs seek-

ing to expand participation in stigmatized work, the location of a vacancy may matter for which workers find it acceptable, including when alternative worksites are within commuting distance. The effectiveness of an employment opportunity can thus depend on whether its social setting allows workers to take up work they are otherwise willing to perform.

More broadly, occupational stigma can shape the spatial organization of work while occupational norms remain in place. The construction evidence and the parallel pattern in stated choices for delivery work suggest that this mechanism can operate across occupations and status distinctions associated with caste and education. Workers may respond to disapproval of an occupation by changing where they perform it. Such adjustment allows participation in stigmatized work without requiring the underlying social judgments to disappear. The economic reach of occupational stigma therefore extends from entry into occupations to the geography of labor supply within them.

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Part I

Appendix

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A Additional Results

A.1 Setting and Sample

Table A-1: Characteristics of screened-out households, by caste group

	Upper/OBC			EBC/SC		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Age (years)	37.62	12.34	225	37.78	11.78	59
Household size (members)	6.26	3.30	224	6.36	3.17	59
Muslim	0.00	0.00	225	0.02	0.13	59
Education (years)	9.38	4.66	224	9.22	4.26	59
Household monthly income (INR)	16729.07	15552.79	172	18886.36	17975.39	44
Concrete (pucca) roof	0.91	0.29	225	0.80	0.41	59
Rooms in the house	4.04	2.63	214	3.12	1.54	56
Owns a bike	0.49	0.50	214	0.23	0.43	56
Smartphone in the household	0.82	0.38	214	0.79	0.41	56
Asset index	0.27	0.67	225	0.01	0.66	59

Notes: The table reports means, standard deviations, and counts of household characteristics for households that did not pass the manual-labor screen; these households received the stigma module but no job offers. Household income is monthly, in rupees, and top-coded at the 99th percentile. The asset index is the standardized mean of the concrete-roof indicator, the number of rooms, the bike indicator, the smartphone indicator, and household income. Migration and work-history questions were not asked of these households. N varies across rows due to item nonresponse.

A.2 The Stigma of Construction Work

Table A-2: First-ranked source of criticism, by caste group

	All		Upper/OBC	EBC/SC
	N	%	%	%
Gotiya (lineage kin)	138	30.1	35.9	21.6
Richer villagers	77	16.8	17.6	15.7
Own-caste neighbors	61	13.3	15.4	10.3
Higher castes	56	12.2	6.2	21.1
In-laws	50	10.9	9.2	13.5
Own family	36	7.9	8.8	6.5
Friends	30	6.6	4.8	9.2
Lower castes	9	2.0	1.8	2.2
Poorer villagers	1	0.2	0.4	0.0

Notes: The table reports the source of criticism each respondent ranked first among the sources they named. The first two columns report counts and shares in the pooled sample; the two group columns report shares within each caste group. Rows are sorted by the pooled share. The ranking question was asked only of respondents who named at least one source of criticism ($N = 458$: 273 Upper/OBC, 185 EBC/SC). The group shares are plotted in Figure 2.

Table A-3: Sources of criticism, any mention, by caste group

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Own-caste neighbors	0.17	866	0.24	423	0.09	442
Lower castes	0.02	866	0.04	423	0.01	442
Higher castes	0.11	866	0.09	423	0.13	442
Own family	0.08	866	0.12	423	0.04	442
Gotiya (lineage kin)	0.21	866	0.30	423	0.13	442
Friends	0.07	866	0.07	423	0.06	442
In-laws	0.08	866	0.09	423	0.07	442
Nothing of this sort happens	0.47	866	0.35	423	0.58	442
Richer villagers	0.14	866	0.19	423	0.10	442
Poorer villagers	0.01	866	0.02	423	0.01	442

Notes: The table reports the share of respondents naming each source when asked who criticizes people of their caste for doing construction work. A respondent could name several sources, so shares do not sum to one. The sample is all consenting households; N is the number of respondents with a nonmissing response. The first-ranked source among those named is reported in Table A-2.

Table A-4: Reasons caste-fellows avoid the visible local job

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Stay near family/home	0.46	828	0.42	403	0.50	424
Same wage, no reason to go far	0.30	828	0.20	403	0.39	424
Local work convenient/easy	0.31	828	0.25	403	0.37	424
Can do own farming/HH work too	0.09	828	0.11	403	0.07	424
No great shame even if seen locally	0.04	828	0.04	403	0.03	424
Saves travel cost	0.17	828	0.15	403	0.18	424
Higher earnings outside	0.01	828	0.01	403	0.01	424
Village does not see the work: saves stigma	0.02	828	0.02	403	0.01	424
More/longer work outside	0.00	828	0.00	403	0.00	424
Save more while away	0.00	828	0.01	403	0.00	424
Learn skills/better work outside	0.00	828	0.00	403	0.00	424
No caste/work taunts outside	0.03	828	0.05	403	0.01	424
Village work shameful, damages standing	0.11	828	0.21	403	0.02	424
Village work hurts marriage prospects	0.01	828	0.02	403	0.00	424
Village daily wage lower	0.01	828	0.01	403	0.00	424
Less work in village	0.01	828	0.01	403	0.01	424
Village pay not on time	0.01	828	0.01	403	0.02	424

Notes: The table reports the share of respondents citing each reason for their answer to the ten-workers question of Figure 1: of ten caste-fellows, how many would take the local construction job when it pays the same as the identical job in Patna. A respondent could cite several reasons, so shares do not sum to one. The sample is all consenting households; N is the number of respondents with a nonmissing response.

A.3 The Caste Gradient

Table A-5: Work location and job take-up, by caste category

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
OBC × nearby	0.133***	0.133***	0.127***	0.133***	0.133***	0.126***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
EBC × nearby	0.032	0.032	0.025	0.032	0.031	0.020
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)
OBC × Patna	0.360***	0.359***	0.354***	0.359***	0.352***	0.368***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)
EBC × Patna	0.127***	0.127***	0.124***	0.126***	0.121***	0.098**
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Nearby	-0.013	-0.012	-0.009	-0.012	-0.123**	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.049)	(0.014)
Patna	-0.239***	-0.238***	-0.233***	-0.238***	-0.248***	-0.217***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.085)	(0.030)
OBC	-0.323***	-0.309***		-0.313***	-0.295***	-0.311***
	(0.043)	(0.047)		(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
EBC	-0.170***	-0.154***		-0.154***	-0.151***	-0.164***
	(0.047)	(0.052)		(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Wage INR 600	0.048***	0.048***	0.047***	0.048***	0.048***	0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
p: OBC = SC (nearby)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
p: EBC = SC (nearby)	0.196	0.197	0.305	0.197	0.203	0.465
p: OBC = EBC (nearby)	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.004
p: OBC = SC (Patna)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
p: EBC = SC (Patna)	0.005	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.009	0.041
p: OBC = EBC (Patna)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Mean, SC at nearby	0.827	0.827	0.827	0.827	0.827	0.843
Mean, SC at Patna	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.606
Village FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Proxy-respondent FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Controls × place	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Location amenities	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,382	3,382	3,381	3,382	3,382	3,150

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. The table reports linear probability estimates of the specification of Table 8 with the Upper/OBC indicator replaced by separate OBC, EBC, and SC categories. Upper caste respondents are excluded: too few of them pass the manual-labor screen for the category to be estimated. The omitted categories are the own-village location, the SC caste group, and the INR 550 wage. Thus, OBC × nearby is the OBC-minus-SC difference in the change in take-up from the own village to the nearby panchayat; the remaining interactions are defined analogously. Column (1) includes no fixed effects; column (2) includes home-village fixed effects; column (3) includes respondent fixed effects, which absorb the caste main effects; column (4) includes home-village and proxy-response fixed effects; column (5) additionally includes age, education, and the asset index, each interacted with location (coefficients not shown); and column (6) instead adds offer-specific ratings of payment reliability, relative benefits, and work difficulty (coefficients not shown). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.4 Mechanisms

Table A-6: Stated reasons for accepting and declining offers

	Cited concealment	Cited being seen
Upper/OBC	0.082***	0.355***
	(0.022)	(0.061)
Wage INR 600	-0.024	0.027***
	(0.029)	(0.010)
Control mean (EBC/SC)	0.017	0.081
Sample	Accepted a hidden offer	Declined a visible offer
Observations	770	655


Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) equals one if a respondent volunteered concealment as a reason for accepting an offer; the sample is accepted nearby and Patna offers. The dependent variable in column (2) equals one if a respondent volunteered being seen as a reason for declining an offer; the sample is declined own-village and nearby offers. Both columns report linear probability estimates with home-village fixed effects and the INR 600 wage indicator. The control mean is the mean of the dependent variable among EBC/SC respondents in the corresponding estimation sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-7: Reasons for declining an offer, by place and caste group

	Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N
Own village: wage low	0.082	184	0.236	165
Own village: village people will taunt	0.359	184	0.097	165
Own village: caste people will taunt	0.245	184	0.042	165
Own village: few days of work	0.011	184	0.085	165
Own village: do not do labour near home	0.092	184	0.073	165
Own village: already have work	0.076	184	0.067	165
Own village: people will see me working	0.147	184	0.055	165
Own village: nobody in house does labour	0.098	184	0.048	165
Nearby: wage low	0.130	138	0.256	168
Nearby: village people will taunt	0.254	138	0.006	168
Nearby: caste people will taunt	0.167	138	0.000	168
Nearby: few days of work	0.014	138	0.054	168
Nearby: do not do labour near there	0.065	138	0.054	168
Nearby: already have work	0.094	138	0.083	168
Nearby: own village will see me working	0.080	138	0.018	168
Nearby: few days of work	0.000	138	0.065	168
Patna: wage low	0.148	135	0.278	313
Patna: cannot do household work	0.052	135	0.035	313
Patna: commute tiring	0.170	135	0.188	313
Patna: cannot leave home	0.237	135	0.179	313
Patna: good work available locally	0.119	135	0.045	313
Patna: nobody in house does labour	0.156	135	0.026	313
Patna: few days of work	0.059	135	0.058	313

Notes: The table reports, for each work location, the share of declined location–wage offers for which the stated reason was volunteered, by caste group. N is the number of declined offers in the cell. A respondent could volunteer several reasons for one decline, so shares do not sum to one. Reason categories differ across locations, so rows are location-specific. A row is shown when the reason was volunteered for at least five percent of either group's declines and both cells contain at least five declines. The accept-side counterpart is Table A-8.

Figure A-1: Preference order over the three jobs, place-indifferent respondents




Notes: After completing the six location–wage choices, respondents named the job they liked most and second best; the rank of the remaining location is implied. Bars report the share of each caste group assigning each rank to each location. The sample is respondents whose acceptance decisions are identical across the three locations at both wages, so that acceptance data alone carry no ordering for them. Respondents answering "none of them" at either rank are excluded.

Table A-8: Reasons for accepting an offer, by place and caste group

	Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N
Own village: family/farm work easy	0.196	97	0.167	294
Own village: commute easy	0.598	97	0.735	294
Own village: wage good	0.268	97	0.269	294
Own village: stay with family	0.216	97	0.201	294
Nearby: family/farm work easy	0.126	119	0.064	296
Nearby: commute easy	0.563	119	0.669	296
Nearby: wage good	0.193	119	0.257	296
Nearby: stay with family	0.126	119	0.101	296
Nearby: village/caste will not see me there	0.076	119	0.014	296
Patna: wage better	0.246	122	0.300	233
Patna: saves me from stigma (not seen)	0.131	122	0.021	233
Patna: local work shameful for caste	0.057	122	0.004	233
Patna: travel paid separately	0.582	122	0.730	233
Patna: no suitable local work	0.139	122	0.172	233

Notes: The table reports, for each work location, the share of accepted location–wage offers for which the stated reason was volunteered, by caste group. N is the number of accepted offers in the cell. A respondent could volunteer several reasons for one acceptance, so shares do not sum to one. Reason categories differ across locations, so rows are location-specific. A row is shown when the reason was volunteered for at least five percent of either group's acceptances and both cells contain at least five acceptances. The decline-side counterpart is Table A-7.

Figure A-2: Preference order over the three jobs, all respondents



Notes: After completing the six location–wage choices, respondents named the job they liked most and second best; the rank of the remaining location is implied. Bars report the share of each caste group assigning each rank to each location. The sample is all respondents with a complete ordering; respondents answering "none of them" at either rank are excluded. Figure A-1 restricts the sample to respondents whose acceptance decisions do not vary across locations.

A.5 Urban Labor Stands

Table A-9: Take-up by offer and caste group, labor-stand sample

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Own village, INR 550	0.621	235	0.433	120	0.823	113
Own village, INR 600	0.643	235	0.458	120	0.841	113
Nearby panchayat, INR 550	0.728	235	0.575	120	0.885	113
Nearby panchayat, INR 600	0.770	235	0.625	120	0.920	113
Patna, INR 550	0.766	235	0.783	120	0.743	113
Patna, INR 600	0.940	235	0.942	120	0.938	113
All six offers	0.745	1410	0.636	720	0.858	678

Notes: Each row reports the unconditional share of workers accepting the construction job at the stated location and daily wage. The sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands. Each location was first offered at INR 550; workers who rejected that offer were subsequently offered INR 600, and workers who accepted at INR 550 are coded as accepting the same job at INR 600. N is the number of workers with a nonmissing choice in the corresponding location–wage cell. The final row pools the six location–wage cells and therefore reports offer-level, rather than worker-level, observations. No controls are included.

Table A-10: Worker characteristics, labor-stand sample

	Upper/OBC			EBC/SC		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Age (years)	33.69	9.57	120	32.53	8.43	114
Education (years)	6.01	4.10	120	5.88	4.54	114
Household size (members)	6.05	2.51	120	5.91	2.25	114
Muslim	0.01	0.09	120	0.01	0.09	114
Own monthly income (INR)	12804.17	3975.65	120	12720.54	3852.16	112
Household monthly income (INR, top-coded at p99)	17087.50	9461.84	112	15705.41	7007.86	111
Owns a bike	0.17	0.38	120	0.16	0.37	112
Smartphone in the household	0.75	0.43	120	0.73	0.44	112
Asset index (bike, phone, income; chowk version)	0.05	0.68	120	-0.04	0.63	112
Owns agricultural land	0.63	0.48	120	0.24	0.43	112
Skilled: works as a mistri	0.00	0.00	120	0.00	0.00	114
Commutes home daily rather than staying	1.00	0.00	120	1.00	0.00	114
Travel time, home to Patna (minutes)	96.62	40.48	120	95.09	48.20	114
Prevailing daily agricultural wage in his area (INR)	433.88	115.58	116	384.50	119.53	111
Prevailing daily construction wage in his area (INR)	525.42	60.11	120	498.66	58.30	112
Years working as a daily wager	10.18	7.36	120	11.22	6.92	114
Ever went to another state for wage work	0.52	0.50	120	0.61	0.49	114

Notes: The table reports means, standard deviations, and counts of characteristics of workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands, by caste group. Household income is monthly, in rupees, and top-coded at the 99th percentile. The asset index is the standardized mean of the bike indicator, the smartphone indicator, and household income; housing items were not collected in this sample. N varies across rows due to item nonresponse.

Table A-11: Perceived chance the home village learns of the work, labor-stand sample

	Upper/OBC		EBC/SC		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p
Chance the village finds out: work in OWN VILLAGE (0-10)	9.76	0.96	9.68	1.12	0.586
Chance the village finds out: work in NEARBY PANCHAYAT (0-10)	6.17	3.35	5.95	3.31	0.615
Chance the village finds out: work in PATNA (0-10)	1.66	2.59	1.81	2.73	0.669
Fall in chance of being found out: own village to nearby	3.59	3.21	3.74	3.22	0.730
Fall in chance of being found out: own village to Patna	8.10	2.69	7.88	2.83	0.537

Notes: The table reports workers' perceived likelihood that people in their home village would learn that they were doing the construction work at each location. Beliefs were elicited after all job choices on a scale from 0 (no chance) to 10 (certain); higher values indicate greater perceived observability to the home village. The sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands, who report on a home village they are away from at the time of the interview. The final column reports two-sided p-values from tests of equality of group means within each location.

Table A-12: Self-reported shame and concealment practices, labor-stand sample

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Panel A: Own shame and observed avoidance						
Worker himself would feel shame doing it in his own village	0.37	235	0.53	120	0.19	113
Has seen people refuse local work but do it outside	0.92	234	0.95	120	0.89	112
Panel B: Concealment methods seen used (any mention)						
Tells the village it is office or factory work	0.92	234	0.94	120	0.90	112
Good clothes and shoes on return	0.02	234	0.03	120	0.01	112
Does not hide the work	0.07	234	0.05	120	0.09	112

Notes: Panel A reports two yes/no questions: whether the worker would feel shame doing construction work in their own village, and whether the worker has seen others refuse work in the village and then do the same work elsewhere. Panel B reports the share who have seen each concealment method used by migrant construction workers; a worker may name several methods, so shares need not sum to one. The final row of Panel B is the residual category, for workers who report that migrants do not hide the work. Methods that no worker reports are omitted from the panel. The sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands; N varies across rows due to item nonresponse.

Table A-13: Reasons for shame from doing construction labor in the own village, labor-stand sample

	All		Upper/OBC		EBC/SC	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Being seen at home						
Being seen by people who know them	0.17	86	0.17	64	0.19	21
People will taunt, laugh or gossip	0.35	86	0.34	64	0.38	21
Lowers family standing, incl. marriage prospects	0.06	86	0.06	64	0.05	21
Status at home						
His own caste standing, while being watched	0.07	86	0.09	64	0.00	21
Has never done this work in their own village	0.30	86	0.31	64	0.29	21
Educated or well-off, so it is beneath them	0.03	86	0.02	64	0.10	21
Has a trade (mistri); labour is a step down	0.01	86	0.00	64	0.05	21
Other						
Reports how the village rates the work	0.08	86	0.06	64	0.10	21
No reason given beyond the shame itself	0.13	86	0.12	64	0.14	21
Memo						
Answer names their own village explicitly	0.81	86	0.83	64	0.76	21

Notes: The table reports the share of workers citing each reason, among workers who said they would feel shame doing construction work in their own village and gave a reason to the open-ended follow-up. Answers were coded by keyword, and one answer can carry several reasons, so shares do not sum to one. Italicized rows are the stigma-related reasons; the memo row reports the share of answers in which the worker names their own village explicitly. Every worker in this sample does construction work, so the row "has never done this work in their own village" refers to the location of the work rather than the work itself, and the caste-standing row excludes answers that only report how the village rates the work; these two rows are therefore not comparable with the corresponding rows of Table 4.

Table A-14: Perceived reductions in observability and job take-up, labor-stand sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.086**	0.058		0.085**
	(0.040)	(0.054)		(0.040)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.406***	0.347***		0.405***
	(0.062)	(0.114)		(0.062)
Believed concealment (SD)	0.049**	0.034		
	(0.024)	(0.028)		
Believed concealment (SD) × Upper/OBC		0.030		
		(0.049)		
Nearby × own nearby gap (SD)			0.028	0.024
			(0.028)	(0.026)
Patna × own Patna gap (SD)			0.050**	0.050**
			(0.023)	(0.023)
Nearby	0.026	0.040	0.117***	0.070***
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Patna	-0.087	-0.057	0.221***	0.010
	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.034)	(0.041)
Upper/OBC	-0.386***	-0.357***		-0.386***
	(0.057)	(0.069)		(0.057)
Wage INR 600	0.080***	0.080***	0.079***	0.080***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.832	0.832	0.832	0.832
Caste interactions included	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,398	1,398	1,410	1,398


Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a worker accepts a location–wage offer; the sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands. For each worker and work location, perceived concealment is the reported observability of own-village work minus the reported observability of work at that location; it equals zero for the own-village offer and is positive when work elsewhere is perceived as less visible. Columns (1) and (2) use a single concealment measure standardized across offer-level observations; column (2) additionally interacts that measure with the Upper/OBC indicator. Columns (3) and (4) instead standardize the village-to-nearby and village-to-Patna observability gaps separately across workers and interact each gap with its corresponding location indicator; column (4) adds the Upper/OBC indicator and its location interactions. All columns include the INR 600 wage indicator; no fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by worker. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-15: Stated reasons for accepting and declining offers, labor-stand sample

	Cited concealment	Cited being seen
Upper/OBC	0.029	0.115
	(0.018)	(0.118)
Wage INR 600	-0.038***	0.038
	(0.010)	(0.025)
Control mean (EBC/SC)	0.019	0.500
Sample	Accepted a hidden offer	Declined a visible offer
Observations	398	289

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) equals one if a worker volunteered concealment as a reason for accepting an offer; the sample is accepted nearby and Patna offers. The dependent variable in column (2) equals one if a worker volunteered being seen as a reason for declining an offer; the sample is declined own-village and nearby offers. The sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands. Both columns report linear probability estimates with the INR 600 wage indicator; no fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by worker. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A-3: Expected take-up of the local job at equal pay, labor-stand sample




Notes: Each worker was asked, of ten workers from their caste, how many would take a construction job in their own village when it pays the same as the identical job in Patna. Bars report the share of each caste group at each answer. The sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands with a nonmissing response.

Table A-16: Heterogeneity specific to the labor-stand sample

	(1) Distance	(2) Local wage	(3) Land	(4) Commuter
Offer in the nearby panchayat	0.071***		0.103***	0.117***
	(0.025)		(0.027)	(0.021)
Offer in Patna	0.009		0.149***	0.221***
	(0.041)		(0.044)	(0.034)
Nearby x Upper/OBC	0.083**			
	(0.041)			
Patna x Upper/OBC	0.408***			
	(0.063)			
High-stigma caste group (General or OBC)	-0.385***	-0.373***		
	(0.057)	(0.059)		
Offer at INR 600 (vs 550)	0.080***	0.079***	0.078***	0.079***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Travel time home-to-Patna (std)	-0.026			
	(0.024)			
Patna x travel time	-0.014			
	(0.029)			
Hidden offer (nearby or Patna)		0.040		
		(0.030)		
Hidden x Upper/OBC		0.247***		
		(0.046)		
Offered INR 550 minus local construction wage (std)		0.027		
		(0.031)		
Hidden x wage gap		0.009		
		(0.024)		
Nearby x owns land			0.033	
			(0.043)	
Patna x owns land			0.172**	
			(0.068)	
Household owns agricultural land			-0.172***	
			(0.063)	
Nearby x commutes daily				0.000
				(.)
Patna x commutes daily				0.000
				(.)
Commutes home daily rather than staying at the worksite				0.000
				(.)
Constant	0.792***	0.785***	0.667***	0.592***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.032)
Observations	1,398	1,392	1,404	1,410

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a worker accepts a location–wage offer; the sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands. Column (1) adds standardized home-to-Patna travel time and its interaction with the Patna indicator. Column (2) replaces the two location indicators with a single indicator for the nearby and Patna offers and adds the standardized difference between the offered INR 550 and the prevailing construction wage at the worker's home, plus its interaction with that indicator. Column (3) interacts the location indicators with agricultural land ownership. Column (4) interacts the location indicators with an indicator for commuting home daily rather than staying at the worksite. All columns include the INR 600 wage indicator; no fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by worker. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A-4: Preference order over the three jobs, place-indifferent labor-stand workers



Notes: After completing the six location–wage choices, workers named the job they liked most and second best; the rank of the remaining location is implied. Bars report the share of each caste group assigning each rank to each location. The sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands whose acceptance decisions are identical across the three locations at both wages. Workers answering "none of them" at either rank are excluded.

B Robustness Checks

B.1 Sample Selection

Table B-1: Stigma measures of screened-out and experimental households

	Upper/OBC				EBC/SC			
	Out	In	Diff	p	Out	In	Diff	p
Community would gossip (vignette)	0.449	0.443	0.006	0.905	0.283	0.188	0.095	0.107
Would feel shame in own village	0.621	0.474	0.148	0.003	0.339	0.141	0.198	0.000
Negative community view	0.470	0.443	0.027	0.585	0.236	0.136	0.101	0.050
Ten-workers count	5.028	5.317	-0.290	0.412	7.434	8.163	-0.729	0.064

Notes: The table reports means of each stigma measure among households that did not pass the manual-labor screen (Out) and households that did (In), within caste group. Diff is Out minus In; p is a two-sided p-value from a two-sample t-test of that difference. The ten-workers count is the number of ten caste-fellows the respondent expects to take the local construction job when it pays the same as the identical job in Patna, so 10 means all are expected to stay.

Table B-2: Stigma measures by respondent type

	Upper/OBC				EBC/SC			
	Self	Proxy	Diff	p	Self	Proxy	Diff	p
Community would gossip (vignette)	0.434	0.464	-0.030	0.701	0.189	0.186	0.002	0.968
Would feel shame in own village	0.449	0.536	-0.087	0.274	0.115	0.279	-0.163	0.001
Negative community view	0.430	0.474	-0.044	0.577	0.127	0.183	-0.057	0.240
Ten-workers count	5.353	5.232	0.121	0.818	8.114	8.417	-0.302	0.412

Notes: The table reports means of each stigma measure among experimental respondents who answered for themselves (Self) and those for whom another household member answered (Proxy), within caste group. A proxy is usually the wife of a man away for work. Diff is Self minus Proxy; p is a two-sided p-value from a two-sample t-test of that difference. All measures were collected before any job offer. The ten-workers count is the number of ten caste-fellows the respondent expects to take the local construction job when it pays the same as the identical job in Patna, so 10 means all are expected to stay.

Table B-3: Assets and income of screened-out and experimental households

	Upper/OBC				EBC/SC			
	Out	In	Diff	p	Out	In	Diff	p
Asset index	0.27	-0.08	0.35	0.000	0.01	-0.18	0.19	0.023
Concrete roof	0.91	0.79	0.11	0.001	0.80	0.69	0.10	0.109
Rooms	4.04	3.18	0.86	0.000	3.12	2.69	0.43	0.036
Owns a bike	0.49	0.23	0.25	0.000	0.23	0.20	0.03	0.553
Smartphone	0.82	0.73	0.09	0.033	0.79	0.73	0.06	0.365
Household income (INR)	16729.07	16254.32	474.75	0.746	18886.36	15620.90	3265.47	0.079

Notes: The table reports means of each asset and income measure among households that did not pass the manual-labor screen (Out) and households that did (In), within caste group. Diff is Out minus In; p is a two-sided p-value from a two-sample t-test of that difference. Household income is monthly, in rupees, top-coded at the 99th percentile, and is the same measure reported in Table 1. The asset index is the standardized mean of the concrete-roof indicator, the number of rooms, the bike indicator, the smartphone indicator, and household income.

Table B-4: Stigma and wealth within Upper/OBC households

	Gossip (vignette)	Own shame	Negative view	Stigma pressure
Panel A: All Upper/OBC households				
Asset index	-0.009	0.018	0.069	0.167
	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.261)
Observations	406	406	407	405
Panel B: Experimental sample only				
Asset index	-0.087	-0.056	0.022	-0.228
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.342)
Observations	192	192	192	189

Notes: Each column reports the coefficient from a separate ordinary least squares regression of the stated stigma measure on the asset index, among Upper/OBC households. Panel A pools households that did and did not pass the manual-labor screen; Panel B restricts the sample to households in the experiment. Stigma pressure is the standardized reverse of the ten-workers measure, so higher values indicate that fewer caste-fellows are expected to work in view of the village. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by village.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.2 Main Estimates

Table B-5: Perceived exposure and the wage response, by caste group

	Upper/OBC	EBC/SC	Difference	p
Panel A: Perceived exposure				
Reduction in observability, own village to nearby panchayat	2.74	3.01	-0.27	0.351
Reduction in observability, own village to Patna	6.49	6.99	-0.50	0.124
Share whose beliefs satisfy village $>$ nearby $\geq$ Patna	0.53	0.55	-0.02	0.598
Panel B: Wage response				
Take-up response to the INR 50 wage increase	0.056	0.044	0.013	0.383

Notes: Panel A reports respondent-level beliefs about the likelihood that people in the home village would learn of the work, elicited after all job choices on a scale from 0 (no chance) to 10 (certain). The first two rows report the reduction in that belief relative to the own-village offer, so higher values indicate a larger perceived fall in observability. The third row reports the share of respondents whose three beliefs satisfy the ordering used in Assumption 1. Panel B reports the estimated change in the probability of accepting an offer when the daily wage rises from INR 550 to INR 600, estimated separately within each caste group with home-village fixed effects and standard errors clustered by respondent. In both panels the difference is the Upper/OBC-minus-EBC/SC difference. The p-values in Panel A are from two-sided tests of equality of group means; the p-value in Panel B is from the interaction between the INR 600 indicator and the Upper/OBC indicator in a pooled specification.

Table B-6: Robustness to location amenities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.117***	0.132***	0.126***	0.122***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.335***	0.334***	0.332***	0.345***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Nearby	0.007	0.018	0.004	0.019
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Patna	-0.191***	-0.188***	-0.188***	-0.185***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Upper/OBC	-0.247***	-0.252***	-0.254***	-0.249***
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Wage INR 600	0.044***	0.044***	0.044***	0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Trusts the contractor to pay on time	0.029***			0.028***
	(0.008)			(0.008)
Non-wage benefits vs own village		0.022**		0.017*
		(0.009)		(0.009)
Work harder than in own village			-0.030**	-0.023
			(0.014)	(0.014)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.783	0.781	0.781	0.783
Pay trust	Yes	No	No	Yes
Relative benefits	No	Yes	No	Yes
Relative difficulty	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,254	3,282	3,296	3,160

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. All columns report linear probability estimates including the location indicators, their interactions with the Upper/OBC indicator, the Upper/OBC main effect, the INR 600 wage indicator, and home-village fixed effects. Column (1) adds the respondent's rating of whether the contractor pays on time; column (2) adds the rating of non-wage benefits relative to the own village; column (3) adds the rating of work difficulty relative to the own village; column (4) adds all three. Each rating is reported per location and varies within respondent across offers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B-7: Main estimates, self-respondents only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.158***	0.158***	0.154***	0.158***	0.156***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.364***	0.364***	0.359***	0.355***	0.387***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.057)
Nearby	-0.010	-0.009	-0.008	-0.084	0.013
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.055)	(0.014)
Patna	-0.207***	-0.207***	-0.202***	-0.170*	-0.186***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.090)	(0.026)
Upper/OBC	-0.324***	-0.302***		-0.281***	-0.300***
	(0.048)	(0.051)		(0.051)	(0.051)
Wage INR 600	0.046***	0.046***	0.044***	0.046***	0.038***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.790	0.790	0.790	0.790	0.795
Village FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Respondent FE	No	No	Yes	No	No
Controls × place	No	No	No	Yes	No
Location amenities	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	2,704	2,704	2,703	2,704	2,524

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. The sample excludes proxy interviews, so every choice was made by the worker in person. Columns (1) through (5) repeat the specifications of Table 8, columns (1) through (5): no fixed effects; home-village fixed effects; respondent fixed effects, which absorb the Upper/OBC main effect; home-village and proxy-response fixed effects; and age, education, and the asset index, each interacted with location. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B-8: Stability of the main estimates across survey samples and order

	(1) Enumerator	(2) Offer order	(3) Proxy
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.120***	0.114**	0.105***
	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.037)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.325***	0.300***	0.311***
	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.056)
Nearby	-0.001	0.009	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.013)
Patna	-0.194***	-0.211***	-0.191***
	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.025)
Upper/OBC	-0.242***	-0.251***	-0.256***
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Wage INR 600	0.048***	0.048***	0.048***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Patna-first order		-0.095***	
		(0.036)	
Nearby × Patna-first order		-0.021	
		(0.032)	
Patna × Patna-first order		0.034	
		(0.048)	
Nearby × Upper/OBC × Patna-first order		0.012	
		(0.079)	
Patna × Upper/OBC × Patna-first order		0.048	
		(0.084)	
Proxy respondent			0.038
			(0.049)
Nearby × Proxy			-0.046
			(0.047)
Patna × Proxy			-0.021
			(0.066)
Nearby × Upper/OBC × Proxy			0.073
			(0.093)
Patna × Upper/OBC × Proxy			0.058
			(0.101)
p: deltas differ across the split		0.844	0.723
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.781	0.781	0.781
Enumerator FE	Yes	No	No
Order interactions	No	Yes	No
Proxy interactions	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,394	3,394	3,394

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. All columns report linear probability estimates including the location indicators, their interactions with the Upper/OBC indicator, the Upper/OBC main effect, the INR 600 wage indicator, and home-village fixed effects. Column (1) additionally absorbs enumerator fixed effects. Column (2) adds an indicator for the Patna-first presentation order, its interactions with the location indicators, and its interactions with the location–Upper/OBC terms. Column (3) adds the same set of terms for proxy-response status. The joint p-value in the lower panel tests the two triple interactions of the corresponding column. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.3 Alternative Explanations

Table B-9: Prior exposure to Patna and to migration

	(1) Patna experience	(2) Migration
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.102**	0.097***
	(0.047)	(0.033)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.229***	0.277***
	(0.087)	(0.067)
Nearby	-0.008	0.002
	(0.022)	(0.016)
Patna	-0.209***	-0.209***
	(0.046)	(0.033)
Upper/OBC	-0.263***	-0.220***
	(0.083)	(0.057)
Wage INR 600	0.048***	0.047***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Worked in Patna	0.066	
	(0.050)	
Nearby × worked in Patna	0.009	
	(0.025)	
Patna × worked in Patna	0.020	
	(0.053)	
Upper/OBC × worked in Patna	0.026	
	(0.093)	
Nearby × Upper/OBC × worked in Patna	0.020	
	(0.057)	
Patna × Upper/OBC × worked in Patna	0.123	
	(0.105)	
Migrated for work		0.043
		(0.043)
Nearby × migrated for work		-0.006
		(0.021)
Patna × migrated for work		0.028
		(0.045)
Upper/OBC × migrated for work		-0.055
		(0.083)
Nearby × Upper/OBC × migrated for work		0.045
		(0.056)
Patna × Upper/OBC × migrated for work		0.114
		(0.096)
p: both triples jointly zero	0.483	0.478
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.780	0.781
Observations	3,364	3,372

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. Both columns report linear probability estimates including the location indicators, their interactions with the Upper/OBC indicator, the Upper/OBC main effect, the INR 600 wage indicator, and home-village fixed effects. Column (1) adds an indicator for having ever worked in Patna, its interactions with the location indicators, its interaction with the Upper/OBC indicator, and the two triple interactions. Column (2) adds the same set of terms for an indicator for having ever migrated to another district or state for work. The p-value in the lower panel tests the two triple interactions of the corresponding column jointly. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B-10: Within-caste wealth and job take-up across locations

	(1)
Hidden offer (nearby or Patna)	-0.096***
	(0.019)
Hidden x Upper/OBC	0.224***
	(0.049)
Hidden x poor	-0.003
	(0.029)
Upper/OBC x poor	0.090
	(0.082)
Hidden x Upper/OBC x poor	-0.002
	(0.066)
High-stigma caste group (General or OBC)	-0.312***
	(0.066)
Below own caste group's median assets	0.040
	(0.042)
Offer at INR 600 (vs 550)	0.048***
	(0.006)
Constant	0.731***
	(0.031)
Observations	3,394

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a location–wage offer. Hidden is an indicator for the nearby and Patna offers; poor is an indicator for household assets below the median of the respondent's own caste group. The specification includes the three pairwise interactions and the triple interaction of hidden, Upper/OBC, and poor, together with the three main effects, the INR 600 wage indicator, and home-village fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.4 Urban Labor Stands

Table B-11: Robustness to location amenities, labor-stand sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nearby × Upper/OBC	0.086**	0.082*	0.084**	0.081*
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Patna × Upper/OBC	0.373***	0.405***	0.396***	0.370***
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Nearby	0.065***	0.077***	0.067***	0.069***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Patna	-0.003	0.016	0.016	0.009
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Upper/OBC	-0.368***	-0.386***	-0.386***	-0.368***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Wage INR 600	0.080***	0.079***	0.079***	0.080***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Trusts the contractor to pay on time	0.037***			0.037***
	(0.013)			(0.014)
Non-wage benefits vs own village		-0.005		-0.012
		(0.011)		(0.012)
Work harder than in own village			-0.020	-0.012
			(0.016)	(0.016)
Control mean (EBC/SC, own village)	0.830	0.832	0.832	0.830
Pay trust	Yes	No	No	Yes
Relative benefits	No	Yes	No	Yes
Relative difficulty	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,378	1,390	1,394	1,376

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a worker accepts a location–wage offer; the sample is workers recruited at sixteen Patna labor stands. All columns report linear probability estimates including the location indicators, their interactions with the Upper/OBC indicator, the Upper/OBC main effect, and the INR 600 wage indicator; no fixed effects are included. Column (1) adds the worker's rating of whether the contractor pays on time; column (2) adds the rating of non-wage benefits relative to the own village; column (3) adds the rating of work difficulty relative to the own village; column (4) adds all three. Each rating is reported per location and varies within worker across offers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by worker.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.5 Placements

Table B-12: From job offers to placements, by sample

	Made	Accepted the offer			Random draw to offer			Matched		
	offers	Own village	Nearby	Patna	Own village	Nearby	Patna	Own village	Nearby	Patna
Village sample	570	396	426	362	16	11	17	22	15	14
Labour-stand sample	235	151	181	221	3	3	6	2	10	13

Notes: Each cell is a count of workers. "Made offers" is the number who answered at least one of the six location–wage offers. "Accepted the offer" counts workers who accepted the job at that location at either wage. "Random draw to offer" counts workers whose randomly drawn offer was one they had accepted and whose one-in-ten implementation lottery was realized. "Matched" indicates the number of workers placed at a job in each location. Matched cells includes both workers whose random draw resulted in an offer as well as those who had accepted the offer but whose random draw didn't result in an offer.

C Survey Questions

The survey was conducted in Hindi. This section reproduces the questions behind the stigma measures, the job offers, and the observability measure, translated from the Hindi text that enumerators read aloud. Instructions to the enumerator appear in brackets. The labor-stand survey uses the same wording.

Own shame. The response options are yes, no, do not know, and do not want to answer.

> Would you feel shame or hesitation in doing construction labor work in your own village?

Respondents who answer yes are then asked, in an open-ended follow-up, "What is the reason for this?"

Stigma pressure against local work. The answer is a number from zero to ten.

> Suppose ten people from your caste were given two options for construction labor work. The first is work in this same village, where people from the village, the family, and the caste can see that they are doing construction labor work. The second is work in Patna city. If the daily wage were the same in both places, how many of the ten workers would prefer to work here, locally?

View of the community. The response options are not read aloud; the enumerator records the answer against a fixed list.

> If people from your caste go to do construction labor work, how do people of your caste or community see them?

The recorded categories are: they consider it good, hard-working work; they look down on it; they mock it behind the person's back; they consider it low work for the caste; they consider it respectable work; and it is considered poor people's work, done out of compulsion.

Script introducing the job offers. Read once, before the first offer.

Now we will ask you some questions about construction labor jobs. Based on your answers, you may later get an actual opportunity to work.

Some things are exactly the same in every job. The work will be labor work in construction, the work will be eight hours each day, and the work may last from five to ten days.

The location of the job changes in each question. The jobs are in three different places: (1) in your own village; (2) in a village of the panchayat next to yours; (3) in Patna city.

We will give you full information about each job. Then we will ask you whether you would want to do that job.

Now we will tell you about three different jobs. You must think about each job separately. Answer as if only that one job were in front of you at that time. Saying yes or no to one job should not affect your answer for the other jobs. If you find the first job acceptable, say yes to it. Then think about the second job separately. If the second job also seems acceptable to you, you can say yes to that as well. In the same way, answer for all three jobs by thinking about each one separately.

[Ask the respondent whether they have any questions so far. If they do, explain.]

When you have given us your answers on all the job questions, one job will be chosen by the computer. If you had said yes to that chosen job, you will be given that job, and if you had said no, you will not be given it.

[For example: suppose you said yes to the question about work in the village, yes to the work in the neighboring panchayat, and yes to the work in Patna. If the lottery then chooses the village job, you will get that job, because you had said yes to it. If you had said no to that question and the computer chose that same question, you would not get that job.]

So say yes only to the jobs you would want to do, and say no to the jobs you would not want to do. If you wish, you may say yes to all the questions, or no to all of them. Saying yes or no on one question will make no difference to the questions that come after it, so answer every question by thinking about it separately.

[Ask the respondent whether they have any questions so far. If they do, explain.]

The number of jobs is limited, so we will not be able to give work to everyone. Suppose the job you said yes to is chosen by the computer. After that there will be a second stage. In this second stage, one person out of every ten chosen will get the work.

[Ask the respondent whether they have any questions so far. If they do, explain.]

The job offers. Six offers follow: the same job at each of the three locations, first at INR 550 and, again at INR 600. The order in which the three locations are presented is randomized. The job described first opens with the first sentence below. Each later job is introduced instead as "Now I will tell you about another job. This is a different and new job from the previous ones. Some things about this job are the same as the jobs described earlier, but the location of this job is different."

> Now I will tell you about a construction labor job. This will be for construction labor work.
>
> The work will be [LOCATION]. The work can last five to ten days, and the work will be eight hours each day.
>
> The daily wage for this work will be INR [WAGE]. That is, for every day you work, you will get INR [WAGE] each day. [TRAVEL]
>
> Answer assuming that if only this job were given to you, would you do the work or not.
>
> Keeping all this in mind, tell us: would you like to do this job?

The three fill-ins take the following values.

- LOCATION: "in your own village"; "in a village of the panchayat next to yours"; or "in Patna city".
- WAGE: 550 at the first offer for a location, and 600 at the second.
- TRAVEL: For Patna, "In addition, your travel costs will be paid".

When the respondent answers on behalf of a household member who does labor work, the closing question instead asks whether that member would want to do the job.

Perceived observability. The answer is a number from zero to ten.

> If, in the job questions described above, you choose to do construction labor work [LOCATION], how likely is it that people in your village will come to know that you are doing labor work? Give the chance between 0 and 10, where 0 means no chance at all of their finding out and 10 means a 100 percent chance of their finding out.

Here LOCATION is "in your own village", "in a village of the panchayat next to yours", or "in Patna".

D Experiment with Urban Youth: Additional Results

This section reports additional results for the experiment with urban youth described in Section 6.

Table D-1: Reasons for hiding the work, and the people it is hidden from

Panel A: Why people hide the work	Delivery work		Call-centre work	
	Share	N	Share	N
People do not consider this good work	0.423	137	0.320	50
People will talk about them or make fun of the work	0.489	137	0.460	50
Family or relatives would not approve	0.051	137	0.040	50
Friends or neighbours would look at them differently	0.080	137	0.080	50
Hesitant or uncomfortable telling others	0.263	137	0.240	50
Not suitable for their education or qualifications	0.102	137	0.080	50
People would assume things about their income	0.051	137	0.080	50
It would make a good marriage match harder	0.007	137	0.000	50
They prefer to keep work and personal life separate	0.000	137	0.000	50
They do not think it necessary to tell others	0.007	137	0.020	50
Panel B: Whom the work is hidden from				
	Share	N		
Friends	0.281	146		
Family	0.130	146		
Relatives	0.514	146		
In-laws	0.192	146		
Neighbours or people in their neighbourhood	0.719	146		
People of their own caste	0.247	146		

Notes: Panel A reports the reasons named by respondents who believe that people who do each job sometimes avoid telling others about it or say they do other work; N is the number of such respondents for each job. Panel B reports the people from whom respondents believe the work is hidden. This question is asked once, of respondents who believe that either job is hidden. In both panels respondents may name more than one answer, so shares need not sum to one. All questions are asked before the job offers.

Table D-2: Raw acceptance rates across jobs, wages, and education groups

	All		Less educated		More educated	
	Share	N	Share	N	Share	N
Call centre, INR 18,000	0.780	282	0.787	127	0.774	155
Call centre, INR 20,000	0.791	282	0.795	127	0.787	155
Delivery, own neighbourhood, INR 18,000	0.528	282	0.598	127	0.471	155
Delivery, own neighbourhood, INR 20,000	0.539	282	0.622	127	0.471	155
Delivery, next neighbourhood, INR 18,000	0.674	282	0.693	127	0.658	155
Delivery, next neighbourhood, INR 20,000	0.688	282	0.717	127	0.665	155
All six offers	0.667	1692	0.702	762	0.638	930

Notes: More educated denotes men who studied beyond class 12 and less educated denotes men with class 12 or less. Each row reports the unconditional share of respondents accepting the stated job at the stated monthly earnings. Each job was first offered at INR 18,000; respondents who declined were then offered INR 20,000. Respondents who accepted at INR 18,000 are coded as accepting the same job at INR 20,000. N is the number of respondents with a nonmissing choice in the corresponding cell. The final row pools the six job–wage cells and therefore reports offer-level, rather than respondent-level, observations. No controls are included.

Table D-3: Education and the ranking of the three jobs

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own neighbourhood × More educated	-0.639***	-0.672***	-0.624***
	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.193)
Next neighbourhood × More educated	-0.308**	-0.312**	-0.352**
	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.156)
Delivery, own neighbourhood	-0.426***	-1.459***	-0.326*
	(0.145)	(0.463)	(0.177)
Delivery, next neighbourhood	-0.591***	-0.715*	-0.518***
	(0.121)	(0.409)	(0.158)
More educated	0.316***	0.328***	0.329***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.105)
Next minus own neighbourhood, × More educated	0.331	0.360	0.272
p-value	0.028	0.016	0.101
Control mean (less educated)	2.339	2.339	2.343
Controls × job	No	Yes	No
Attribute beliefs	No	No	Yes
Respondents	254	254	242
Observations	762	762	645

Notes: After the six offers, each respondent names the job they would choose if they had to choose one, and then the better of the remaining two. Each respondent contributes one observation per job. The dependent variable is the score of that job: 3 if chosen first, 2 if second, and 1 if last. The sample is the 254 respondents who give a complete ordering. The call-centre job and less-educated men are the omitted categories. More educated denotes men who studied beyond class 12 and less educated denotes men with class 12 or less. The row "Next minus own neighbourhood, × More educated" reports the difference between the two education interactions, which measures how much more the more-educated men prefer the next-neighbourhood delivery job over the own-neighbourhood one; the following row reports its p-value. Column (1) includes no controls; column (2) adds age and its interaction with each job; column (3) adds the respondent's ratings of the earnings stability, job security, and chances of promotion of that job. The control mean is the mean score of the call-centre job among less-educated men. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D-4: The response to work location, by the composite status index

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Next neighbourhood × status index	0.035	0.036	0.030
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Next neighbourhood (vs own neighbourhood)	0.146***	0.146***	0.147***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Status index	-0.088***	-0.087***	-0.101***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Wage INR 20,000	0.012**	0.012**	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Control mean (own neighbourhood)	0.534	0.534	0.549
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes
Attribute beliefs	No	No	Yes
Respondents	282	282	234
Observations	1,128	1,128	936

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a respondent accepts a delivery offer. The sample is the four delivery offers; the own neighbourhood is the omitted location. The composite status index is the standardized mean of years of schooling, household income, and household ownership of a four-wheeler and of a motorcycle or scooter. Because the index includes schooling, age is the only individual control. Column (1) includes no controls; column (2) adds age and its interaction with the next-neighbourhood indicator; column (3) additionally adds the respondent's ratings of the earnings stability, job security, and chances of promotion of delivery work. All columns include the INR 20,000 wage indicator. The control mean is acceptance of the own-neighbourhood offer among all respondents. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Identification of the spatial labor-supply comparisons

This appendix establishes the individual-choice and identification results used in Section 2. We first show how the social penalty changes labor supply and the relative attraction of locations. We then distinguish comparisons in reservation-wage units from comparisons in take-up units and derive the nearby identification result and the city lower bound for each. The last result states how the take-up bound carries over to averages across the offered wages.

Throughout, an offer is evaluated against the same outside option, and comparisons across locations hold the job fixed. The joint distribution of outside options, task costs, location values, stigma burdens, and observability may differ between groups. All expectations used below are assumed to exist. The results are population statements; sampling uncertainty must be taken into account when estimating their empirical counterparts.

E.1 Individual labor supply and the location of work

Aggregation of social exposure. The scalar social penalty can accommodate different discovery risks across members of the reference group. Let $Z_{ip\ell}$ indicate whether person p learns that worker i performs job j at location ℓ, and let $\pi_{ip\ell} = \mathrm{P}(Z_{ip\ell} = 1)$. Conditional on discovery, this audience member imposes the wage-equivalent penalty $a_{ip}d_{ipj} \geq 0$. These weights and conditional penalties are held fixed across locations. Holding the worker and offer fixed, and taking expectations over discovery events, linearity of expectations gives

$$\mathrm{E}\left[\sum_{p\in\mathcal{R}_i} a_{ip}d_{ipj}Z_{ip\ell}\right] = \sum_{p\in\mathcal{R}_i} a_{ip}d_{ipj}\pi_{ip\ell} = \rho_{i\ell}B_{ij}, \tag{E.1}$$

where $B_{ij} = \sum_{p\in\mathcal{R}_i} a_{ip}d_{ipj}$ and, when $B_{ij} > 0$,

$$\rho_{i\ell} = \frac{\sum_{p\in\mathcal{R}_i} a_{ip}d_{ipj}\pi_{ip\ell}}{B_{ij}} \in [0,1].$$

The interval restriction follows because this is a weighted average of discovery probabilities with nonnegative weights. When $B_{ij} = 0$, all weighted penalties are zero, so any choice of $\rho_{i\ell} \in [0,1]$ gives the same zero social cost. This derivation requires neither independent discovery events nor simultaneous discovery by all reference-group members. If their discovery probabilities coincide, $\rho_{i\ell}$ equals that common probability. Otherwise, it measures exposure weighted by the social consequences of discovery. The job index is suppressed on $\rho_{i\ell}$ and $q_{i\ell}$, although both may depend on the job; every spatial comparison below holds that job fixed.

Acceptance and location choice. Write the expected social penalty as $s_{ij\ell} = \rho_{i\ell}B_{ij}$, with $B_{ij} \geq 0$ and $\rho_{i\ell} \in [0,1]$. The reservation wage and potential acceptance decision are

$$\omega_{ij\ell} = r_i + \kappa_{ij} - q_{i\ell} + s_{ij\ell}, \qquad T_{ij\ell}(w) = \mathbf{1}\{w \geq \omega_{ij\ell}\}. \tag{E.2}$$

We adopt acceptance at indifference; none of the weak inequalities below depends on that convention when there are no atoms at the offered wages. The normalization is $q_{iV} = 0$. Location-invariant costs, including any intrinsic aversion to the occupation, are included in κ_{ij}. The intervention considered below removes $s_{ij\ell}$, holding these other costs and benefits fixed.

Proposition 1 (Labor supply and location preferences)**.** *Holding the other primitives fixed, raising B_{ij} or $\rho_{i\ell}$ weakly raises the reservation wage and weakly lowers acceptance at any given wage. Raising $q_{i\ell}$ has the opposite effects. The reservation-wage advantage of location ℓ relative to the village is*

$$C_{ij\ell} = \omega_{ijV} - \omega_{ij\ell} = q_{i\ell} + G_{ij\ell}, \qquad G_{ij\ell} = (\rho_{iV} - \rho_{i\ell})B_{ij}. \tag{E.3}$$

If $\rho_{iV} > \rho_{i\ell}$, a larger stigma burden raises this location advantage, holding location values and observability fixed. At a common wage, a worker who strictly prefers a destination M to village work chooses the destination over both village work and rejection if and only if $w \geq \omega_{ijM}$.

Proof. The threshold in equation (E.2) is affine in each primitive, with

$$\frac{\partial \omega_{ij\ell}}{\partial B_{ij}} = \rho_{i\ell} \geq 0, \qquad \frac{\partial \omega_{ij\ell}}{\partial \rho_{i\ell}} = B_{ij} \geq 0, \qquad \frac{\partial \omega_{ij\ell}}{\partial q_{i\ell}} = -1.$$

The indicator $\mathbf{1}\{w \geq \omega_{ij\ell}\}$ is weakly decreasing in its threshold, establishing the labor-supply claims. Subtracting the two reservation wages cancels r_i and κ_{ij} and yields equation (E.3). In particular,

$$\frac{\partial C_{ij\ell}}{\partial B_{ij}} = \rho_{iV} - \rho_{i\ell},$$

which is positive under the stated individual observability ordering. Finally, surplus relative to rejection at location ℓ is $w - \omega_{ij\ell}$. The destination gives strictly greater surplus than village work exactly when $C_{ijM} > 0$, and it gives nonnegative surplus exactly when $w \geq \omega_{ijM}$. Under the stated tie convention, these two conditions jointly characterize choosing the strictly preferred destination over village work and rejection. □

The last distinction separates a spatial incentive from realized labor supply. A reduction in observability can make destination work more attractive relative to village work even if both offers remain below the worker's reservation wage. Conversely, a location advantage does not require a change in a binary response when both offers are already acceptable. The same comparison describes commuting or migration when their respective travel, separation, and other location costs are included in q_{iM}; it does not by itself determine whether the worker changes residence.

E.2 Group comparisons in reservation-wage units

For the fixed occupation, suppress the job subscript. Recall that D_ℓ is the difference between groups in the mean reservation-wage advantage $C_{i\ell}$, and define

$$S_\ell \equiv \mathrm{E}[G_{i\ell} \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[G_{i\ell} \mid L], \qquad \Delta q_\ell \equiv \mathrm{E}[q_{i\ell} \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[q_{i\ell} \mid L].$$

Here and below conditioning on g means conditioning on membership in group g.

Proposition 2 (Reservation-wage decomposition)**.** *For every location ℓ,*

$$D_\ell = \Delta q_\ell + S_\ell. \tag{E.4}$$

Under Assumption 3, $D_N = S_N$. If observability is common across workers at each location, then

$$S_\ell = (\rho_V - \rho_\ell)\Delta B. \tag{E.5}$$

Proof. Taking the conditional expectation of equation (E.3) within each group and subtracting gives equation (E.4). Assumption 3 sets $\Delta q_N = 0$. In the common-observability case, $\rho_V - \rho_\ell$ is constant and can be factored out of each conditional expectation, yielding equation (E.5). □

The common-observability expression is illustrative and is not required by any result below. In general, the social gain depends on the joint distribution of stigma burdens and observability changes. For $X_{i\ell} = \rho_{iV} - \rho_{i\ell}$,

$$\mathrm{E}[G_{i\ell} \mid g] = \mathrm{E}[X_{i\ell} \mid g]\mathrm{E}[B_i \mid g] + \mathrm{Cov}(X_{i\ell}, B_i \mid g).$$

Consequently, the mean orderings in Assumptions 1 and 2 do not by themselves order the mean social gains across groups. These assumptions describe the intended exposure and stigma comparisons; the restrictions used to identify and bound the group contrasts are stated separately.

Take-up observed at two wages does not generally identify mean reservation wages. With $w_1 < w_2$, the response pairs $(1,1)$, $(0,1)$, and $(0,0)$ imply, respectively, $\omega \le w_1$, $w_1 < \omega \le w_2$, and $\omega > w_2$ under equation (E.2). Changing reservation wages within these intervals leaves every observed response unchanged but can change their group means. The reservation-wage results therefore describe the underlying mechanism, whereas the following take-up results apply directly to the observed outcome.

E.3 Identification using job acceptance

Let $a_i = r_i + \kappa_i$. The actual and counterfactual acceptance decisions at location ℓ are

$$T_{i\ell}(w) = \mathbf{1}\{w \ge a_i - q_{i\ell} + \rho_{i\ell}B_i\}, \qquad T^0_{i\ell}(w) = \mathbf{1}\{w \ge a_i - q_{i\ell}\}. \tag{E.6}$$

Thus, T^0 removes only the exposure-dependent social penalty. It holds the occupation, outside option, location attributes, and any location-invariant intrinsic costs fixed. Define the acceptance loss due to this penalty as

$$\begin{aligned} R_{g\ell}(w) &= \mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) - T_{i\ell}(w) \mid g] \\ &= \mathrm{P}(a_i - q_{i\ell} \le w < a_i - q_{i\ell} + \rho_{i\ell}B_i \mid g)\,. \end{aligned} \tag{E.7}$$

The probability equality follows because the nonnegative penalty can change acceptance only from one to zero. Hence $0 \leq R_{g\ell}(w) \leq 1$.

Assumption 4 supplies a common mapping from changes in wage-equivalent offer value to changes in acceptance probabilities. To state its role precisely, write

$$Z_i = (q_{iN}, q_{iP}, B_i, \rho_{iV}, \rho_{iN}, \rho_{iP}), \qquad F_g(t \mid z) = \mathrm{P}(a_i \leq t \mid Z_i = z, g).$$

For $z = (q_N, q_P, B, \rho_V, \rho_N, \rho_P)$ and $q_V = 0$, let $I(z)$ be the smallest closed interval containing q_ℓ and $q_\ell - \rho_\ell B$ for every $\ell \in \{V, N, P\}$. The assumption requires that, at each offered wage, there exist $b(w) > 0$, common to both groups and all types, such that

$$F_g(w + x \mid z) = F_g(w \mid z) + b(w)x \qquad \text{for every } x \in I(z), \tag{E.8}$$

for each group and almost every z in its support. The right-hand side must remain in $[0, 1]$, and restrictions at different wages apply to the same conditional CDF. Baseline probabilities $F_g(w \mid z)$ may vary by group and type. The condition is exact over the relevant threshold intervals, rather than a globally linear CDF. It describes conditional population heterogeneity in a_i and requires no additional individual choice shocks.[9]

Recall the actual and counterfactual location interactions,

$$\delta_\ell(w) = \mathrm{E}[T_{i\ell}(w) - T_{iV}(w) \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[T_{i\ell}(w) - T_{iV}(w) \mid L], \tag{E.9}$$

$$\delta^0_\ell(w) = \mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) - T^0_{iV}(w) \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) - T^0_{iV}(w) \mid L], \tag{E.10}$$

and define $S^T_\ell(w) = \delta_\ell(w) - \delta^0_\ell(w)$.

Proposition 3 (Common response and nearby identification)**.** *Under Assumption 4, for each offered wage and $\ell \in \{V, N, P\}$,*

$$R_{g\ell}(w) = b(w)\mathrm{E}[\rho_{i\ell}B_i \mid g]. \tag{E.11}$$

The location interactions satisfy

$$\delta_\ell(w) = b(w)D_\ell, \qquad \delta^0_\ell(w) = b(w)\Delta q_\ell, \qquad S^T_\ell(w) = b(w)S_\ell. \tag{E.12}$$

In particular, under Assumption 3 as well,

$$\delta^0_N(w) = 0, \qquad \delta_N(w) = S^T_N(w) = b(w)S_N.$$

Thus parallel nearby take-up in the absence of the social penalty follows from the equal-mean location-value restriction and the common response condition.

[9] For example, suppose a_i conditional on $(Z_i = z, g)$ is uniform on $[m_g(z), m_g(z) + K]$, with common $K > 0$, and all relevant thresholds lie in this interval. Then $F_g(w + x \mid z) = (w + x - m_g(z))/K$ at those thresholds, satisfying the restriction with $b(w) = 1/K$. This is one sufficient distribution, not an additional maintained assumption.

Proof. Conditional on $(Z_i = z, g)$, the threshold rules and equation (E.8) give

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{E}[T_{i\ell}(w) \mid Z_i = z, g] &= F_g(w + q_\ell - \rho_\ell B \mid z) = F_g(w \mid z) + b(w)(q_\ell - \rho_\ell B), \\
\mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) \mid Z_i = z, g] &= F_g(w + q_\ell \mid z) = F_g(w \mid z) + b(w)q_\ell.
\end{aligned}$$

Subtracting the first equality from the second and taking expectations within group g proves equation (E.11). Subtracting actual village acceptance from actual acceptance at ℓ cancels $F_g(w \mid z)$ and gives

$$\mathrm{E}[T_{i\ell}(w) - T_{iV}(w) \mid Z_i = z, g] = b(w)\{q_\ell + (\rho_V - \rho_\ell)B\}.$$

Taking expectations within each group and subtracting gives $\delta_\ell(w) = b(w)D_\ell$ by Proposition 2. Repeating these operations for the penalty-free decisions gives $\delta^0_\ell(w) = b(w)\Delta q_\ell$. Their difference is $S^T_\ell(w) = b(w)(D_\ell - \Delta q_\ell) = b(w)S_\ell$. Assumption 3 sets $\Delta q_N = 0$, yielding the final statements. □

For interpretation, the definition of the acceptance losses also gives the decomposition

$$\begin{aligned}
\delta_\ell(w) &= \delta^0_\ell(w) + S^T_\ell(w), \\
S^T_\ell(w) &= [R_{HV}(w) - R_{H\ell}(w)] - [R_{LV}(w) - R_{L\ell}(w)].
\end{aligned} \tag{E.13}$$

To verify it, substitute $\mathrm{E}[T_{i\ell}(w) \mid g] = \mathrm{E}[T^0_{i\ell}(w) \mid g] - R_{g\ell}(w)$ for each location and group in equation (E.9) and collect terms. The common response condition then converts this difference in acceptance losses into $b(w)$ times the difference in social-cost reductions. For the delivery application, the same proof uses only V and N, with the corresponding two-location vector Z_i and threshold interval.

The common response condition is a substantive distributional restriction. Its exact equalities require exact affinity over the stated ranges. Moreover, $b(w)$ is not automatically identified by the difference between acceptance at the two offered wages: that interpretation additionally requires the affine restriction to cover the wage change itself.

E.4 The city lower bound

The city can offer additional concealment while also changing networks, travel burdens, and other attributes. The bound concerns the component of the city interaction attributable to the social penalty. Assumption 5 orders the additional reductions in expected social costs, and the common response condition transfers that ordering into acceptance units. Equality of the groups' non-stigma valuations of the city is not required.

Proposition 4 (Lower bounds on the city stigma component)**.** *Under Assumptions 3 and 5,*

$$S_P \geq D_N. \tag{E.14}$$

If Assumption 4 also holds, then at each offered wage,

$$S_P^T(w) \geq \delta_N(w). \tag{E.15}$$

Neither bound requires equality of the groups' non-stigma valuations of the city or equality of their counterfactual city acceptance responses.

Proof. For each worker,

$$G_{iP} - G_{iN} = (\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i.$$

Taking the difference between group means and using $D_N = S_N$ from Proposition 2 gives

$$\begin{aligned} S_P - D_N &= S_P - S_N \\ &= \mathrm{E}[(\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[(\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i \mid L] \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the final inequality is Assumption 5.

For take-up, Proposition 3 gives $S_P^T(w) = b(w)S_P$ and $\delta_N(w) = b(w)D_N$. Consequently,

$$\begin{aligned} S_P^T(w) - \delta_N(w) &= b(w)(S_P - D_N) \\ &= b(w)\{\mathrm{E}[(\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i \mid H] - \mathrm{E}[(\rho_{iN} - \rho_{iP})B_i \mid L]\} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

because $b(w) > 0$ and the term in braces is nonnegative under Assumption 5. No additional ordering in acceptance units is required. □

The bounded object is the stigma component of the city interaction. The total interactions also include the non-stigma components:

$$D_P = S_P + \Delta q_P, \qquad \delta_P(w) = S_P^T(w) + \delta_P^0(w).$$

Accordingly, the additional condition $\Delta q_P \geq 0$ would suffice for $D_P \geq D_N$ and, under the common response condition, for $\delta_P(w) \geq \delta_N(w)$ as well: Proposition 3 implies $\delta_P^0(w) = b(w)\Delta q_P \geq 0$. This additional condition is not needed for the component bounds. If $\delta_N(w) > 0$, the take-up result assigns at least that much of the city interaction, in probability units, to the differential stigma component even when the non-stigma component is negative.

Corollary 1 (Averaging across offered wages)**.** *Let $\mathcal{W}$ be a finite set of offered wages and let $\pi_w \geq 0$ be common weights satisfying $\sum_{w\in\mathcal{W}} \pi_w = 1$. Define*

$$\overline{S_P^T} = \sum_{w\in\mathcal{W}} \pi_w S_P^T(w), \qquad \overline{\delta_N} = \sum_{w\in\mathcal{W}} \pi_w \delta_N(w).$$

If Assumptions 3, 4, and 5 hold, with the common response condition applying at each offered wage, then

$$\overline{S_P^T} \geq \overline{\delta_N}. \tag{E.16}$$

Proof. Multiply equation (E.15) by π_w at each wage and sum. Nonnegative weights preserve the inequalities. □

For the construction experiment, $\mathcal{W} = \{550, 600\}$, and equal weights give $\pi_{550} = \pi_{600} = 1/2$. The delivery experiment applies the nearby identification result to its own offered wages and neighborhood comparison; it does not supply the third location required for the city bound. The averaging result uses the same weights for the two comparisons. It is a statement about the target population contrasts and does not assert that every regression specification automatically implements those weights. Nor does a bound on a population parameter make its point estimate a lower confidence bound.